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Abstract 
In the years immediately after World War II, Dwight D. Eisenhower insisted that he did 
not want to run for office. However, the general, persuaded by the efforts of Citizens for 
Eisenhower groups, reversed his decision before the 1952 election. The new politician did not 
take an easy path to the White House, however, as Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, the leading 
conservative Republican, fought to represent the GOP. Eisenhower aligned with the moderate 
faction, the party’s traditional source of power, and joined the Republicans during the early 
stages of a civil war in the party. From the time Eisenhower received the presidential nomination 
in 1952 until his death in 1969, he committed himself to leading the GOP and establishing 
moderate, not conservative, Republicanism as the party’s ideology. However, this aspect of 
Eisenhower’s political career has largely been ignored by historians. The analyses of Eisenhower 
that focus on his presidency, rather than his military career, concentrate on policy decisions, 
omitting the president’s role as party leader during a transformative era. This oversight not only 
skews Eisenhower’s legacy but also renders analyses of the conservative revolution in American 
politics incomplete. Before conservative Senator Barry Goldwater secured the Republican 
nomination in 1964, a very important moment that augured — but did not guarantee — the 
future triumph of the conservative wing, Eisenhower worked to stop his campaign. Had 
Eisenhower succeeded, the GOP and American politics could have followed a much different 
trajectory in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Utilizing documents from throughout 
Eisenhower’s political career, this study argues that although Eisenhower failed to halt 
conservatism, he influenced the course of the GOP. During the 1950s and 1960s, Eisenhower 
helped revitalize the party, improved the party’s organization, and contributed to conservatism’s 
delayed ascendancy. Furthermore, Eisenhower merits recognition as a party leader who worked 
tirelessly on behalf of moderate Republicanism, not just as a man with impressive coattails for 
Republicans to cling to during elections.  
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Introduction 
On the evening of May 3, 2007, the ten men vying for the 2008 Republican presidential 
nomination gathered in Simi Valley, California. As the politicians discussed topics ranging from 
the war in Iraq to stem cell research, a decommissioned Air Force One served as their backdrop. 
More so than the large aircraft, one man loomed over the event — Ronald Reagan. During the 
first debate at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum, candidates invoked the ex-
president’s legacy in their quest to lead the GOP.1 Just a few years later, the Reagan Library 
hosted the Republicans’ candidates for the 2012 election, demonstrating the continued influence 
of the ex-president.  
 Long before Reagan served as the standard bearer for the GOP, he actually was a 
registered Democrat. Then, partly influenced by his employer, General Electric, Reagan started 
to move right on the political spectrum, eventually settling on the opposite end with the 
conservative Republicans.2 This shift toward the GOP coincided with the candidacy of Dwight 
D. Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956, and the former actor campaigned for the moderate Republican. 
However, Reagan continued to move further right and emerged as a new leader of the right when 
he spoke on behalf of the very conservative Senator Barry Goldwater during the 1964 campaign. 
Reagan’s popular “A Time for Choosing” speech resonated with conservatives and sparked 
discussion of the former actor running for office. After Goldwater’s crushing defeat in 1964, 
Reagan’s victory in California’s 1966 gubernatorial race provided conservatives with a new 
                                                 
1 Adam Nagourney and Marc Santora, “Republican Candidates Hold First Debate, Differing on Defining Party’s 
Future,” The New York Times, May 4, 2007.  
2 David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism: A Short History (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 169. 
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leader for their movement.3 The nomination of Goldwater in 1964 demonstrated the growing 
power of the right within the GOP and national politics, but only when Reagan won the 
presidency in 1980 did the conservatives successfully stage a political revolution.  
 Before Eisenhower won the 1952 presidential election, the Democrats were the dominant 
political party. After four failed attempts to defeat Franklin D. Roosevelt, the popular wartime 
president, members of the GOP hoped another war leader, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, could 
defeat Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, in 1948.  Although inexperienced with elective 
politics, Eisenhower’s notoriety and knowledge of international affairs made him an attractive 
candidate for both parties. Neither party knew Eisenhower’s political affiliation because he 
insisted on remaining apolitical during his military career. The Republicans, however, 
unknowingly possessed the advantage in the pursuit of Eisenhower, as the ex-general registered 
and voted Republican in 1948. Eisenhower did not reveal that information, and despite his 
refusals, both parties continued to pursue him.4 Eventually, Eisenhower reversed his decision, 
and during the early, speculation-heavy stages of the 1952 campaign, declared his candidacy for 
the Republican presidential nomination.5 The party that the ex-general joined tested him from the 
start, as two factions — moderates and conservatives — vied for control of the GOP.  
 Historians trace the escalation of the split within the Republican Party to the post–World 
War II era, precisely when Eisenhower entered the world of elective politics. The GOP’s primary 
candidates for 1952, Eisenhower and Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, represented the two 
factions, and their policy positions highlighted the differences between the sides. At the crux of 
the divide was whether to maintain the strong federal government created by the New Deal and 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 170–72.  
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956: The White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 
20. 
5 Ibid, 8.  
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World War II. Taft’s opposition to international commitments and federal social welfare and 
regulatory programs represented key tenets of the conservative philosophy. Moderates, on the 
other hand, did not seek a complete reversal of the New Deal or the destruction of America’s 
modest welfare state. Furthermore, Eisenhower and other moderates supported internationalism, 
including the alliances forged after the war.6 Twenty years of Democratic leadership forged a 
new political identity for the United States, and although conservatives sought to revert to past 
policies, moderates focused on altering, not eliminating, America’s domestic and international 
commitments.  
 Eisenhower’s decision to challenge Taft for the Republican nomination in 1952 sparked 
intense fighting within the party. However, Eisenhower’s alignment with the moderate wing, 
which controlled the GOP due to its strength in the electorally and financially strong Northeast, 
provided him with an advantage over Taft.7 Once Eisenhower secured the Republican 
nomination, he sought to unite the conflicted party. To attract conservatives and younger voters, 
Senator Richard M. Nixon of California received the call to serve as Eisenhower’s running mate. 
Respected for his participation in the prosecution of Soviet spy Alger Hiss, Nixon’s reputation as 
a communist hunter appealed to conservatives. Nixon, though, would go on to have what 
historians deemed an “ambiguous” place in the GOP.8  Despite his conservative record in 
Congress, Nixon supported Eisenhower’s policies and by the time of his own presidency, 
pursued moderate and liberal initiatives. Eight years of working with Eisenhower led Nixon to 
drift away from the right. By the time Nixon needed to stand on his own, his ties to both wings of 
                                                 
6 Michael Bowen, Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 1–9, 130–36. 
7 Steven Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism: Pursuing the Middle Way (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2006), 3.  
8 Ibid, 5.  
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the GOP led many Republicans to question his political alignment.9 The gesture of picking 
Nixon did little to minimize the conservatives’ criticism of Eisenhower.  
To garner support from conservative Republicans in Congress, Eisenhower reached out to 
his former opponent Taft. The two managed to develop a positive working relationship, but 
Taft’s death early in Eisenhower’s administration robbed the president of his strongest link to 
conservatives.10 Vice President Nixon’s experience with Congress and party politics did help 
Eisenhower, but he failed to serve as the link that Eisenhower needed to gain the support of all 
Republicans.11 When Taft died, so did one of Eisenhower’s greatest chances for uniting 
Republicans. This setback did not deter Eisenhower from advocating moderate Republicanism or 
seeking to unite the GOP. From his nomination in 1952 until his death in 1969, Eisenhower 
embraced his role as party leader, and continuously worked to halt the polarizing and 
strengthening conservative movement.   
Historians of Eisenhower’s political career have focused on his policy decisions, not his 
work as a leader of the Republican Party. This oversight, however, ignores a significant element 
of Eisenhower’s life in politics and a key chapter in the history of the GOP. In 1952, the future of 
the Republican Party was especially uncertain. Eisenhower sought to establish the party as a 
moderate one that embraced what he termed “the middle way,” also referred to as “middle of the 
road,” “modern Republicanism,” or “Eisenhower Republicanism.” By balancing the extremes of 
                                                 
9 Ibid.  
10 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Arthur Eisenhower, September 11, 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, 
Kansas (hereafter Eisenhower Library), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61 
(Ann Whitman File), Name Series, (hereafter Whitman Name Series), Box 11, Folder: “Eisenhower, Arthur (3).” 
11 Chester J. Pach, Jr. and Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, rev. ed. (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1991), 51.  
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the right and left, Eisenhower hoped to enact policies with broad appeal that neither restricted 
nor inflated the power of the federal government.12      
Historical approaches to Eisenhower’s presidency and his post-presidential political 
legacy have evolved since he left office in 1961. Initially, historians doubted the efficacy of his 
leadership, often describing him as a genial old man who preferred the golf course to the Oval 
Office. Then, political scientist Fred I. Greenstein researched the general’s administration and 
argued that Eisenhower quietly led America through the 1950s. Greenstein’s “hidden-hand” 
thesis, published in 1982, ushered in a wave of new scholarship that recognized Eisenhower as a 
leader who, though he delegated tasks to others, remained in control of and closely monitored 
domestic and international affairs.13  
Scholarship on the other half of Eisenhower’s political career — his role as party leader 
— follows the same trajectory. Historians and political scientists long overlooked Eisenhower’s 
work with the Republicans, partly due to the widely accepted belief that he could have won 
representing either party. But recent scholarship has started to acknowledge that Eisenhower did 
act as a leader of the GOP. The small advances Eisenhower made, such as daring to campaign in 
the supposedly solidly Democratic South, have earned recognition.14 Gradually, Eisenhower’s 
political reputation has improved, though aspects of his career remain unexplored. Existing 
accounts tend to conclude with Eisenhower leaving office, omitting his work as an ex-
president.15 Focused on the future of the GOP, the former president communicated regularly with 
                                                 
12 Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism, 5.  
13 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982).  
14 Daniel J. Galvin, Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 69.  
15 See Galvin, Presidential Party Building, Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism, Jim Newton, Eisenhower: 
The White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 2011), and Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of 
Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, From Eisenhower to the Tea Party (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
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fellow Republicans, all in the hope of setting the GOP on a moderate path. However, in histories 
of the Republican Party, the first half of the 1960s are mostly remembered for the Goldwater 
candidacy. Eisenhower’s attempts to establish a moderate leadership for the GOP during the 
1960s are overshadowed, even though Nixon won the 1968 election. Even though Eisenhower 
did not accomplish all of his goals for the Republicans, he did influence the party, and he merits 
recognition for his work on behalf of the GOP during the presidential and post-presidential years.  
 Eisenhower occupies a complex spot in the history of the Republican Party and American 
politics. Although regarded as one of America’s top presidents when pundits or historians rank 
past leaders, Eisenhower nonetheless remains in the background of the story of the GOP and the 
conservative ascendancy of the late twentieth century. The party that exists today extols Reagan, 
and Eisenhower represents a more liberal perspective. Regardless of where he falls on the 
spectrum of the current Republican Party, Eisenhower played a greater role in the history of the 
party than usually recognized. The GOP’s shift to the right was hardly predetermined when 
Eisenhower took office in 1953, and Eisenhower was crucial in staving off the conservative take-
over for a significant period of time.  
This study analyzes Eisenhower’s seventeen years of fighting the rise of conservatism. 
The first chapter focuses on the pre-Eisenhower GOP and his transition from general to president 
and party leader. Eisenhower’s alignment with the moderates and his “middle way” perspective 
is analyzed, along with his efforts to build a strong intellectual foundation for the party. Then, 
shifting to Eisenhower’s time as elder statesman, the second chapter covers Nixon’s failed 
presidential run in 1960, and Eisenhower’s efforts to rally the moderates once the GOP lost the 
White House after the election of John F. Kennedy. Eisenhower’s primary concern between 1961 
and 1964 was securing the 1964 presidential nomination for a moderate, which meant exploring 
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options to halt Barry Goldwater’s candidacy. Committed to his party, however, Eisenhower 
begrudgingly worked with Goldwater once the Arizonan received the nomination. Finally, this 
study concludes with Eisenhower’s efforts to rally the GOP after Goldwater’s defeat — while 
seeking to prevent its movement to the right. Governor George Romney of Michigan and Nixon 
emerged as the party’s top candidates, and both received support from Eisenhower. The final 
years of Eisenhower’s life coincided with Nixon finally moving into the White House in 1969.  
 Throughout Eisenhower’s professional life, first in the military and then in politics, he 
preferred to act in the shadows. By appointing individuals he believed to be the best qualified for 
their positions, Eisenhower had faith his subordinates could handle affairs and react similar to 
him. However, this did not mean an abdication of responsibility. The misunderstanding of 
Eisenhower’s political career can be traced directly back to the incorrect contemporary notion 
that Eisenhower remained disengaged from affairs, particularly in regards to the GOP. Instead, 
for example, Eisenhower called upon Nixon’s experience and shrewdness when working with 
Congress, and he consulted other top Republicans when striving to develop the ranks of 
Republican voters. By not publicly expressing doubts about Goldwater, moreover, Eisenhower 
opted to respect the decision made by his party’s members, not influence the outcome of the 
nomination process. This thesis will demonstrate that by utilizing his “hidden hand” leadership 
style, Eisenhower worked to guide the GOP along the “middle way” and prevent the rise of 
conservatism. For this reason, Eisenhower merits recognition as a key participant in the 
conservative revolution. Ultimately, the right won the war for control of the GOP, but as long as 
he was alive, Eisenhower remained committed to leading the moderates to victory.  
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Commander of the Moderate Republicans: 
Eisenhower’s Emergence as a GOP Leader 
In February 1952, a group of Republican congressmen collaborated on a letter to General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, then commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
seeking to convince him to run for office. “Prompted by the messages we are receiving daily,” 
the congressmen wrote, voters “want you to come home, they want you to declare yourself on 
the pressing issues of the day, they want the inspiration of your dynamic honesty and the 
forthrightness of your statesmanship. The demands of these patriotic Americans have a right to 
be heard, and we beg you to listen to them because we agree with them.”16 Why, despite 
Eisenhower’s inexperience with elective politics, did these congressmen, appeal to the general to 
run for office? What Eisenhower lacked in experience, he made up for with his reputation. “We 
feel deeply that those basic convictions for which you have stood,” the congressmen wrote, “and 
which are shared by millions of people deserve your personal leadership in this crucial hour. 
Your return home will unite our people as never before.”17 Ultimately, the congressmen’s appeal 
claimed that voters wanted Eisenhower to run because of a widespread perception that only he 
could be the leader that America needed in 1952. 
                                                 
16 The complete list of Congressmen to sign the letter asking Eisenhower to run for office is: Clifford R. Hope (R-
Kans.), Hugh D. Scott, Jr. (R-Pa.), Winston L. Prouty (R-Vt.), Claude I. Bakewell (R-Mo.), Jacob K. Javits (R-
N.Y.), Edward L. Sittler, Jr. (R-Pa.), Albert M. Cole (R-Kans.), Clifford P. Case (R-N.J.), John W. Heselton (R-
Mass.), Harmar D. Denny, Jr. (R-Pa.), Norris H. Cotton (R-N.H.), Christian A. Herter (R-Mass.), James C. 
Auchincloss (R-N.J.), Thruston B. Morton (R-Ky.), Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (R-Mich.), Thor C. Tollefson (R-Wash.), R. 
Walter Riehlman (R-N.Y.), W. Sterling Cole (R-N.Y.), and Robert W. Kean (R-N.J.). Clifford R. Hope, et al. to 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 22, 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter Eisenhower 
Library), Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), Name 
Series, (hereafter Whitman Name Series), Box 14, Folder: “Famous Letters.” 
17 Ibid. 
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In Eisenhower, the Republicans saw a popular candidate who could lead them back into 
the White House for the first time in twenty years. Indeed, coattails, not ideas, attracted 
politicians to Eisenhower. Both primary parties expressed interest in Eisenhower, and he could 
have run on either ticket in 1952. Political scientist Daniel Galvin explained that because of the 
impression that “Eisenhower was uninterested in party politics and disengaged from the 
Republican Party,” historians have considered him as a “president above party.”18 Many 
scholarly accounts, therefore, barely mention Eisenhower’s role as GOP leader, even when in the 
White House.19 This oversight is particularly surprising given the past generation of Eisenhower 
scholarship, which, led by the work of political scientist Fred Greenstein, has reassessed 
Eisenhower’s political career. Immediately after Eisenhower left office, historians questioned his 
efficacy as a politician, but, according to Greenstein’s “hidden hand” thesis, Eisenhower 
preferred to handle policy decisions quietly and to delegate affairs to others, but he was hardly 
detached from his office.20 Eisenhower applied a similar approach to his party-centric work, but 
Eisenhower the party leader remains an overlooked aspect of his political career.  
Overall, this study examines Eisenhower’s role in post–World War II politics and in the 
Republican Party during the formative stages of the party’s move to the right. For years, 
Republicans upset by the GOP’s move to the center during the 1930s and 1940s fought to 
reclaim control of their party. The conservatives eventually celebrated their first major victory in 
1964 when Senator Barry Goldwater received the GOP’s presidential nomination. I argue that 
Eisenhower, the leading advocate of moderate Republicanism, tried to stop the conservative 
                                                 
18 Daniel J. Galvin, Presidential Party Building: Dwight D. Eisenhower to George W. Bush (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010), 41. 
19 Analyses of Eisenhower often focus on just one aspect of his life, e.g. his military career or presidential years. The 
wealth of information on Eisenhower limits the content of comprehensive works to key details about his life and 
work from World War II through the end of the presidency. 
20 Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982).  
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revolution before control of the GOP shifted to the right. Eisenhower not only brought the GOP 
back to the White House but also tried to construct a moderate party that could thrive without 
him. President during a transitional period for the GOP, Eisenhower oversaw one of the 
moderates’ last major efforts to retain control of the Republican Party.    
This chapter begins by analyzing the GOP’s era of turmoil that started after Franklin D. 
Roosevelt won the 1932 election. Ex-president Herbert Hoover’s handling, or lack thereof, of the 
Great Depression crippled the Republicans. Then, in response to the expansive policies of 
Roosevelt and the Democrats, members of the GOP split into moderate and conservative 
factions. Conflicting interpretations of Republican ideology led conservatives, who believed that 
Eisenhower did not represent Republican values, to reject his candidacy and to support Senator 
Robert A. Taft for the 1952 nomination.21 But in 1952, moderates, who exerted much of the 
power within the GOP, wanted Eisenhower. A willingness to accommodate parts of the New 
Deal contributed to moderates garnering support from the business community and other 
residents of the well-populated and wealthy East Coast.22 With money and votes on their side, 
moderates agreed with the widely held view that few individuals could defeat the respected 
Eisenhower, thus making him an ideal candidate for the embattled GOP.23 Conservatives built up 
their support base in the 1950s and 1960s, but in office, Eisenhower worked with fellow 
moderates to strengthen their faction and to limit the rise of the right.24  
Even before Eisenhower moved into the White House, he advocated a “middle way” in 
politics, thereby tying him to the moderates. After analyzing Eisenhower’s decision to run for 
                                                 
21 Michael Bowen, The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft, and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican 
Party (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 117.  
22 Steven Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism: Pursuing the Middle Way (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2006), 3. 
23 Robert Mason, The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 142–51. 
24 Galvin, Presidential Party Building, chap. 3. 
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office, this chapter will delve into his political philosophy, particularly its application to policy 
and party matters. Caught between what he considered the extremes of conservatism and 
liberalism at mid century, Eisenhower believed that America’s interests were best served by 
sticking to a middle of the road approach. This led to Eisenhower’s moderate “middle way” 
perspective, also referred to as “Eisenhower Republicanism” or “modern Republicanism,” 
because the new president wanted Republicans to keep looking forward, not revert to old 
policies. 25 A self-described political novice, Eisenhower did not waver from his perspective 
throughout his political career.26  
The same cannot be said for his vice president — Senator Richard Nixon. Eisenhower 
remained committed to the moderate Republican philosophy, but Nixon’s place on the spectrum 
of GOP politics fluctuated. Due to his reputation as a communist hunter, based partly on the 
successful prosecution of Alger Hiss, Nixon had the respect of the right wing as he joined 
Eisenhower on the ticket in 1952. Continued association with Eisenhower, however, led Nixon 
toward the middle, especially as the 1960 presidential campaign loomed. Nixon tried to maintain 
his ties to the right, however, even after he lost to Kennedy in 1960. Nixon campaigned for 
staunch conservative Goldwater in 1964 and received support from the right wing during his 
second run for the White House in 1968. Once Nixon took office, though, conservatives realized 
that while Nixon remained a Republican, he had moved to the moderate, if not liberal, side of the 
                                                 
25 Modern Republicanism is also called the middle way and Eisenhower Republicanism. Eisenhower often used the 
first two terms. He resisted the term Eisenhower Republicanism because he did not want the moderate perspective to 
depend upon him. See Wagner, Eisenhower Republicanism. 
26 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956: The White House Years (New York: Doubleday, 1963), 
28.  
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party.27 As a result of this change, Eisenhower would consider Nixon’s win in 1968 as a victory 
for moderate Republicanism.  
Nixon’s place on the ticket helped Eisenhower appeal to conservatives in 1952, but he 
also brought political experience. Due to Eisenhower’s military career, he was familiar with 
diplomatic politics, but not party politics or congressional affairs. Nixon’s skills in those arenas 
complimented the new politician’s shortcomings, and would lead to him acting on Eisenhower’s 
behalf on different occasions. Eisenhower, though, quickly learned how to play the game of 
politics while remaining loyal to the “middle way.” This game would ultimately be lost by the 
moderates, but not without Eisenhower’s best efforts to establish the GOP as the party of 
moderation. 
 The Elephant before Eisenhower 
 
Two men traveled to Chicago, Illinois in July 1952 with a strong possibility of receiving 
the Republican Party’s nomination for president. Senator Robert Taft, son of the ex-president 
and leader of the party’s conservative wing, sought the nomination that he had lost in 1948 to 
New York Governor Thomas Dewey. Former general Dwight D. Eisenhower competed for the 
nomination on behalf of the moderates. With tensions high, a group of attendees pushed for a 
“fair play” amendment to prohibit the ability of contested delegates to participate in the 
nominating process.28 By the time the GOP left Chicago, Eisenhower and the conservative-
leaning Senator Richard Nixon received the nominations for president and vice president, 
                                                 
27 Donald T. Critchlow, Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), 202–10.  
28 James A. Hagerty, “Lodge Cites Plans: Says Eisenhower Camp Will Push ‘Fair Play’ Delegate Proposal,” New 
York Times, July 7, 1952.  
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respectively. The moderates achieved victory in July, and in a few months the GOP followed 
Eisenhower to Washington, D.C.  
 Eisenhower’s first two years in office marked the first period in twenty years that the 
Republicans controlled the White House and Congress at the same time. Despite periods of 
uncertainty in the GOP’s history, the Republicans had developed into a thriving party by the 
beginning of the twentieth century.29 However, when ex-president Theodore Roosevelt, 
dissatisfied with the performance of his replacement, William Howard Taft, left the party in 
1912, the positive momentum the GOP had developed was shattered. Roosevelt’s failed 
reelection bid in 1912 on the Progressive Party’s ticket, which robbed Republicans of votes, 
weakened the new party.30 Gradually the elephants rebuilt the GOP, and by the time Herbert 
Hoover won the 1928 election, the Republicans appeared to be on a positive trajectory.31 
However, the Great Depression, which began in 1929, disrupted the GOP’s plans. After 1930, 
the Republicans struggled to overcome Hoover’s legacy of failing to end the Depression. And 
then, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt enjoyed an unparalleled four-term presidency.  
 Under Roosevelt, the Democrats aimed to accomplish much more than economic 
recovery. They oversaw a redefinition of the federal government’s role in America’s domestic 
and foreign affairs. At home, New Deal programs expanded the reach of the federal government 
and created the modern American welfare state. The daily activities of individuals and state 
governments faced greater involvement by federal authorities courtesy of different economic 
policies. The march toward a world war, including the establishment of a wartime economy, 
                                                 
29 Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party, 
From Eisenhower to the Tea Party (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), xvii.  
30Lewis L. Gould, Grand Old Party: A History of the Republicans (New York: Random House, 2003), 153–92.  
31 Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 4.  
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further extended the authority of those in Washington, D.C. Republicans, meanwhile, faced a 
wave of popular changes that flatly rejected the GOP’s principle of favoring small government.32  
 Although even a united Republican Party would have faced an uphill battle undermining 
Roosevelt and the New Deal, the party suffered from fractious in-fighting. At the root of the 
factions’ differences lay whether or not the New Deal should be completely rejected or partly 
accepted. Since the party had moved away from its roots in antislavery politics and become the 
party of big business in the final third of the nineteenth century, the GOP had espoused the rights 
of individuals. In the twentieth century, Republicans continued to advocate this perspective, but 
some started to question strict adherence to the party’s anti-statist ideology. Moderates, rather 
than completely rejecting Roosevelt’s policies, opted to accept elements of the New Deal. Even 
though some New Deal initiatives failed, others offered much-needed financial assistance, made 
capitalist arrangement more predictable, and helped support wartime industries. And Americans 
of the time generally supported them. The moderates’ decision to make peace with much of the 
New Deal promised an opportunity to regain support from voters who believed that Hoover and 
the GOP failed them during the Depression. Torn apart by those who clung to tradition and those 
willing to adapt, however, the Republican Party further complicated its post-Hoover recovery by 
struggling to cooperate and agree on a coherent platform.  
Historians pinpoint the New Deal era as a key period for the formulation of today’s 
American political identities. In The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, historian 
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David Farber wrote that “the New Deal had forced a new divide in American politics, with 
politicians and their constituents … sort[ing] themselves out as liberals or conservatives.”33 
Those who supported the New Deal aligned with the former. The conservatives emerged as those 
who refused to accept any part of the New Deal. Still, some Republicans did fall somewhere in 
between the two ends of the political spectrum. Caught in the middle, the GOP’s moderate 
faction, which later included Eisenhower, demonstrated a willingness to accept many elements of 
the New Deal, but they also sought to limit its further extension. Support for New Deal 
programs, such as Social Security, was based on a mixture of genuine approval and political 
necessity. Eisenhower, for example, decided to support, and even expand, Social Security 
because, according to his “middle way” philosophy, the government should be able to assist 
individuals when necessary, but he also determined that one could not have a political future 
without accepting popular elements of the New Deal.34  
 Before Roosevelt’s administration exposed the Republicans’ inner turmoil in the 1930s 
and 1940s, the party’s different interests hindered its ability to cooperate in national politics. 
Even though Hoover turned into the GOP’s scapegoat for the Depression, the real problems went 
beyond leadership. In his history of the Republicans, Lewis Gould writes that “there were 
ideological and political reasons that the Republican Party had not moved to enact [reforms] 
during its years of power; each reform would have threatened a major constituency of the 
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Republican constituency.”35 The Republicans were caught between industrial interests in the East 
and farm interests in the Midwest and West. These perspectives, at times, contradicted one 
another. During the 1920s and 1930s, some constituents remained faithful to the troubled party; 
others decided to leave the GOP. And here a geographical division surfaced. Eastern 
Republicans typically supported the New Deal, whereas Western Republicans very often 
opposed it. In the 1930s, the power within the party lay with the eastern contingent. Industry had 
the funds and cities provided larger voting blocs than the rural West. Upset with their 
marginalization, conservatives viewed the moderates’ willingness to support the New Deal as a 
betrayal. The bitter sentiment haunted the party and would intensify during the 1940s.36   
During the 1930s, and especially with their victory in the midterm elections of 1938, 
Republicans slowly recovered from their 1932 nadir, but Roosevelt’s resilient popularity 
hindered efforts to take back the White House. In 1944, the GOP hoped that former Democrat 
Wendell Willkie could unseat the incumbent president. Without a cohesive and appealing 
platform to challenge the wartime president, however, the moderate Willkie lost decisively. In 
The Roots of Modern Conservatism, historian Michael Bowen identified the 1940s as a decade 
when “the Republicans were leaderless and adrift with nothing to offer the people while the 
Democrats appeared to have all the answers.”37 Leaders existed within the party, but no one 
figure linked the factions. Ohio Senator Robert Taft led the conservative “Old Guard,” while 
New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey led the moderates.38 The wings, Bowen notes, 
“developed incompatible campaign strategies and platforms,” partly because “the severity of the 
Republican plight … prompted a sense of urgency and caused both factions to aggressively seek 
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control of the GOP.”39 The intra-party conflict intensified during the 1940s, with the GOP caught 
between the conservatives and moderates’ increasingly irreconcilable views.  
 As America moved into the postwar period, the conservative element within the GOP 
started to emerge as a cohesive movement. The three primary tenets of the conservative 
movement were economic libertarianism, cultural traditionalism (which strove to protect existing 
social structures), and anti-communism, which sprang from the development of the Cold War 
with the Soviet Union in the late 1940s.40 With this platform, conservatives strove to restore the 
old Republican Party to power and alter the course that America was on after the establishment 
of the New Deal and the welfare state. Some historians of conservatism, such as Kim Phillips-
Fein, focus on the economic motives for conservatism’s development, specifically the rejection 
of New Deal policies and the emergence of corporate-sponsored laissez-faire interest groups and 
think tanks.41 Other historians, however, offer a more comprehensive account of the formation of 
the conservative movement during the postwar era. In The Republican Right since 1945, for 
example, David W. Reinhard credits opposition to Democrats’ domestic and foreign policies as 
key factors in the creation of the conservative platform. Wary of a strong federal government, the 
right-wing supported limited federal involvement in domestic affairs and a minimal presence in 
foreign affairs.  
Both moderates and conservatives viewed the 1948 elections as an opportunity to finally 
unseat the Democrats. Support for President Truman had waned, and, in a test of conservatism’s 
strength, the right hoped to nominate Taft, “Mr. Republican.”42 Yet the moderate Dewey 
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prevailed in the contest for the nomination. Amid the battle between the GOP’s two leading 
figures, other names circulated as potential candidates. Following America’s triumph in World 
War II, prominent participants emerged as attractive options for public office. George C. 
Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton, and Douglas MacArthur topped the wish 
lists of politicians and voters alike. But none of these generals entered the 1948 contest, and 
Truman won one of the most dramatic elections in U.S. history. The speculation about the 
political futures of America’s military leaders did not end in 1948, and Eisenhower moved to the 
forefront of desired candidates.43   
 Recruiting the General 
 
Disconnected from the bitter state of domestic affairs and well-versed in international 
relations, Eisenhower received overtures from the Republicans and Democrats to run in 1948. 
Both parties encountered a problem — no one knew Eisenhower’s personal politics. But this 
ignorance did not hinder recruiting efforts. One newspaper, for example, noted that “in the 
opinion of experienced political observers, the general would have been a shoo-in as the nominee 
of either party. He would have drawn support from both extremes and the middle of the political 
spectrum.”44 With such broad appeal, politicians could not have created a more attractive and 
electable candidate. Eisenhower, familiar with balancing international politics with military 
strategy, did not want to enter a different realm of the political game by running for office. 
Earnest efforts to lure Eisenhower into national politics first started while he relocated to 
Washington, D.C. in 1945 to serve as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Previously, Eisenhower 
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dismissed any remarks about his potential future as a politician as a joke.45 As the discussions of 
turning the general into a candidate persisted, Eisenhower’s childhood friend, Captain E. E. 
“Swede” Hazlett, asked about the subject in an exchange of letters. On March 13, 1946, 
Eisenhower confided in Hazlett that the speculation about his political future upset him. In 
response to Hazlett’s political questions, the general admitted, “When trying to express my 
sentiments myself I merely get so vehement that I grow speechless, if not hysterical.”46 Upset 
that his disavowals of political ambition went ignored, Eisenhower went on to reveal to Hazlett 
that “I cannot conceive of any set of circumstances that could ever drag out of me permission to 
consider me for any political post from Dog Catcher to ‘Grand High Supreme King of the 
Universe.’”47 Eisenhower went so far as to release public remarks that clearly expressed his wish 
to remain out of politics, but the speculation about his future persisted.48   
Even though Eisenhower expressed a disinterest in politics, he demonstrated a deep 
concern and affection for the American political system. The Hazlett-Eisenhower 
correspondence reveals the general’s worries about American affairs. Eisenhower’s letter to 
Hazlett on August 25, 1947, opens with another disavowal of political ambitions, confessing that 
he and Mamie craved little more than a quiet, private life. However, the focus soon becomes 
political affairs, with Eisenhower remarking that “my own deepest concern involves America’s 
situation in the world today. Her security position and her international leadership I regard as 
matters of the gravest to all of us and to our national future.”49 Eisenhower immediately follows 
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with the confession that “there may be little that I can do about such matters.”50 Eisenhower’s 
declarative comments do not initially appear to reveal a conflicted national figure, but 
consideration of this letter and others demonstrate how Eisenhower, despite statements to the 
contrary, never completely turned his back on American politics. 
Politicians and voters did not give up on the possibility of an Eisenhower candidacy 
following 1948. Not long after that election, Eisenhower’s name surfaced in discussions about 
the 1952 contest. In November 1949, The Portsmouth Times reported:  
Since 1948, Gen. Eisenhower’s political character has jelled. Though he still is 
not officially either a Republican or a Democrat, he has adopted a political 
position that might be described as progressive conservatism; i.e., in favor of 
holding fast to that which is good and being alert to opportunities to make things 
better according to American principles of liberty and self-reliance.51 
 
For many Republicans, Eisenhower’s change shifted the battle to woo Eisenhower in their favor. 
Eisenhower aligned with basic party values, and his “progressive conservatism” stance appealed 
to both factions.52 If Eisenhower agreed to run in 1952, the GOP could not only nominate a 
popular figure but also one with the potential to unite the party. 
The early weeks of 1952 served as a turning point for Eisenhower, the moment in which 
he decided to run for president. Two major appeals in February of 1952 contributed to 
Eisenhower’s reversal of his stance on politics. While in Europe to lead the newly formed North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Eisenhower received a letter from Congressmen Jacob 
Javits (R-N.Y.), Christian Herter (R-Mass.), Gerald Ford (R-Mich.), and other prominent 
Republicans. The carefully worded letter appealed to Eisenhower on behalf of all American 
voters. With a clause disavowing any hopes for a position in the Eisenhower administration, the 
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congressmen hoped that Eisenhower’s sense of duty to his country would determine his political 
future.53  
The Republican congressmen’s letter to Eisenhower conveyed the desires of their 
constituents for an Eisenhower candidacy, but the actions of those constituents proved to be the 
most effective means of recruiting Eisenhower. Just a few days before the letter from 
congressional leaders reached Eisenhower, aviatrix Jacqueline Cochran traveled to Europe to 
deliver footage of a pro-Eisenhower rally held in Madison Square Garden. Cochran, who had 
served as director of the Women Airforce Service Pilots during World War II and was co-chair 
of the rally, brought a video of thousands of people crowded into the famous arena to 
demonstrate their support for Eisenhower.54 Organized by several citizens’ groups that emerged 
to support an Eisenhower candidacy — for example, Eisenhower Bandwagon Committee, Youth 
for Eisenhower, and Veterans for Eisenhower — the “Serenade for Eisenhower” rally gathered 
15,000 to 20,000 people in Madison Square Garden on February 8, 1952. The evening’s events 
ranged from musical performances to speeches to a celebration of Eisenhower’s recent victory 
over Senator Taft in a primary-like poll organized by a Republican group in West Hartford, 
Connecticut.55 Officially, Eisenhower was not yet a candidate, but that fact did not stop voters 
and potential voters from demonstrating that they liked Ike. 
The grassroots efforts of the various “Draft Eisenhower” groups resonated with the 
general more than any other overture. After watching the rally footage, Eisenhower wrote to 
Hazlett that “the two hour film brought home to me for the first time something of the depth of 
the longing America today for change—a change that would bring, they hope, some confidence 
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that the disturbing problems of our country will be sensibly attacked and progress made toward 
solving them.”56 Deeply affected by the voters’ call to action, Eisenhower confessed: “I can’t tell 
you what an emotional upset it is for one to realize suddenly that he himself may become the 
symbol of that longing and hope.”57 Once Eisenhower realized how much citizens, not 
politicians, wanted him to be president, he reconsidered his political future. Early primary 
results, including a write-in campaign in Minnesota that featured varied spellings of the general’s 
name and a New Hampshire contest where Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (Mass.) had to 
personally vouch for Eisenhower’s Republican affiliation, further proved to Eisenhower that 
voters, not just power-hungry politicians, wanted him to run for office.58 
 Following the “Middle Way” 
 
Before Eisenhower decided to run for the presidency, he delivered a speech as President 
of Columbia University that hinted at his political philosophy. On September 5, 1949, 
Eisenhower addressed a meeting of the American Bar Association in St. Louis, Missouri. During 
his speech, Eisenhower discussed Americans’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and stated that 
they “express the common faith of loyal Americans — the shining guide that, for the vast 
majority, points always the straight path to America’s future. In the industrialized economy of 
the twentieth century, that path lies down the middle of the road between the unfettered power of 
concentrated wealth on one flank, and the unbridled power of statism, or partisan interest, on the 
other.”59 This perspective, coupled with his assessment of the current state of politics, led 
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Eisenhower toward the moderate Republicans. Eisenhower’s familiarity with international affairs 
prevented him from supporting the right-wing of the Republican Party’s isolationist perspective. 
Senator Taft, the leading conservative candidate for the GOP’s nomination in 1952, “favored a 
foreign policy that placed the needs of the United States over any external commitments,” 
Michael Bowen reported.60 Eisenhower sought to convince Taft to endorse NATO, the North 
American-European alliance organized for collective defense purposes, but Taft withheld 
support of the group Eisenhower once led.61 In response, Eisenhower joined the race partially to 
keep “Taft from bringing on World War III,” as historian Geoffrey Kabaservice wrote.62 
Concerned with the GOP’s international policies, Eisenhower also worried about the Democrats. 
Although supportive of elements of the New Deal, Eisenhower believed that Democrats’ plans to 
expand it would further restrict individual enterprise, and, ultimately, according to Kabaservice, 
he “mistrusted what he considered to be the fiscal incontinence of Truman’s Fair Deal.”63 With 
voters calling for Eisenhower to run and the general troubled by Taft and Truman’s policies, 
Eisenhower formally entered politics in 1952. 
Why did Eisenhower ultimately join the GOP? Almost immediately after Truman’s 
election in 1948, Republicans pleaded with Eisenhower for him to help unseat the Democrats. 
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“In 1948, ’49, ’50, ’51 and early ’52, many hundreds of people were urging me to go into 
politics,” Eisenhower wrote to his brother Edgar.64 He continued: 
Scores of different reasons were advanced as to why I should do so, but in general 
they all boiled down to something as follows: ‘The country is going socialistic so 
rapidly that, unless Republicans can get in immediately and defeat this trend, our 
country is gone. Four more years of New Dealism and there will be no turning 
back. This is our last chance.’65 
 
Elements of this argument appealed to Eisenhower, who agreed that politics should not follow an 
extreme path. However, opposition to extremism meant that Eisenhower agreed with aspects of 
both the Democrats and Republicans’ platforms. Caught between two sides, the general at least 
partially credited his friends for the decision to align with the GOP. Eisenhower recounted his 
entry into politics in a September 1952 letter to Edward M. Earle of Princeton’s Institute of 
Higher Studies, writing: “having yielded to the importunities and arguments of my friends [to 
run], I see no recourse for me except to hang on firmly to my own ideals and standards, and to 
remember that the friends who persuaded me agreed that, with my convictions I’d have to 
declare as a Republican.”66 Written just two months before the 1952 election, these remarks 
depict Eisenhower as a politician with little say in his career.  
Yet, contrary to historians’ initial assessments of Eisenhower as an inexperienced 
political puppet, he based his decision to align with moderate Republicans on a thorough 
understanding of domestic and international issues. This understanding shaped Eisenhower’s 
political philosophy, the “middle way,” which he first publicly addressed in 1949 and 
subsequently followed throughout his administration. Eisenhower had registered and voted 
Republican in 1948, but he did not completely embrace his party’s traditional platform, and, as 
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mentioned, supported aspects of the Democrats’ platform.67 Personal involvement with 
international affairs, particularly America’s membership in NATO, helped shape Eisenhower’s 
perspective on foreign policy.  
For domestic policies, Eisenhower supported a strong federal government, which at first 
glance seemed to align more with the Democrats than the Republicans, but overall he favored a 
combination of the two perspectives.68 In a letter to his sister-in-law Lucy, Eisenhower described 
his moderate position: 
I have come to the conclusion that the true middle-of-the-road position is about as 
follows: Demand from the individual the maximum effort that he can make to 
take care of himself. The government at the city, state and Federal levels should 
participate in helping the individual over and above what he himself can do in 
providing adequate insurance policies.69 
 
The Republican ideal of emphasizing the power of the individual is at the heart of Eisenhower’s 
belief, but he also recognized that the government needed to be prepared to intervene when 
necessary. Rather than placing faith entirely in the individual or in the state, Eisenhower favored 
a system in which the state would assist an individual in times of crisis, and, in the case of Social 
Security, also act as an insurer of last resort. Eisenhower explained to Lucy “that as a result of 
social and industrial revolutions and the breakdown of the so-called ‘laissez-faire’ in industrial 
life, people are going to demand that the government do something to give them an opportunity 
to live out a satisfactory life.”70 Historian Robert Griffith elaborated on this perspective, 
explaining that Eisenhower favored an economy based on cooperation between individuals and 
the state because, as Eisenhower said, “in our tightly knit economy, all professions and callings 
— no matter how widely separated they may be in purpose and technique — all have points of 
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contact and areas of common interest. Banker or housewife, farmer, carpenter, soldier — no one 
of us can live and act without effect on all the others.”71 For Eisenhower, the socio-economic 
conditions caused by the new relationship between the federal government and citizens 
necessitated a modification of the Republican perspective. The moderate, “middle way” 
approach — what came to be called Eisenhower or modern Republicanism — accepted a larger, 
more powerful government, but it demanded that “the great effort must be to place the maximum 
amount of responsibility on the individual.”72 
 For Eisenhower, the “middle way” offered a pragmatic approach to politics, especially 
domestic affairs, but extreme views from the right and left overshadowed the moderate 
perspective. Retired Brigadier General B. G. Chynoweth, who once served in Panama with 
Eisenhower, challenged the “middle way” philosophy, primarily its adherence to Republican 
ideology. Eisenhower’s lengthy response demonstrated how he agreed and disagreed with 
opinions from the right and the left. “Coming down to our own day,” Eisenhower wrote on July 
13, 1954:  
We have those individuals who believe that the federal government should enter 
into every phase and facet of our individual lives, controlling agriculture, industry 
and education, as well as the development of every natural resource in our 
country. These people, knowingly or unknowingly, are trying to put us on the path 
toward socialism. At the other extreme we have the people — and I know quite a 
number of them — who want to eliminate everything that the federal government 
has ever done that, in one way or another, represents what is generally classified 
as social advance. For example, all of the regulatory commissions established in 
Washington are anathema to these people. They want to abolish them completely. 
They believe that there should be no trade union laws and the government should 
do nothing even to encourage pension plans and other forms of social security in 
our industry. When I refer to the Middle Way, I merely mean the middle way as it 
represents a practical working basis between extremists, both of whose doctrines I 
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flatly reject. It seems to me that no great intelligence is required in order to 
discern the practical necessity of establishing some kind of security for 
individuals in a specialized and highly industrialized age.73 
 
This perspective placed Eisenhower just to the right of moderate on the political spectrum. First, 
Eisenhower flatly rejects the left’s wishes to further expand the welfare state and amass even 
more power for the federal government. However, he then admonishes the antiquated views of 
those on the far right, arguing that elements of the conservative platform would entail removing 
progressive policies necessary to support the new socio-economic conditions in America. With 
this philosophy, Eisenhower aligned with the moderate Republicans, who sought to update 
traditional Republicanism to fit current political and social demands.   
 In addition to his political philosophy, Eisenhower’s assessment of the New Deal’s 
political legacy helped define his moderate place in the political spectrum. Expanding upon his 
argument that no party could win with a platform based on reversing the New Deal, Eisenhower 
told his brother Edgar in 1956 that “it is silly to believe that any individual in the world — or, 
indeed, any party — can actually turn a whole population back from a course it has pursued in 
the belief that that course is assisting the majority of the population.”74 As the Republicans’ fight 
over the New Deal intensified, Eisenhower recognized the futility of taking a strong stance 
against programs “that are generally believed to help the social or economic welfare of vast 
portions of our population.”75  Despite later labels as an old, out-of-touch leader, Eisenhower 
correctly described the conservatives as out of sync with politics and the electorate. Eisenhower 
wrote in 1956 that the right needed to “devote their effort to helping stabilize the situation rather 
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than criticizing efforts which recognize that you cannot return to the days of 1860.”76 For 
Eisenhower and the moderates, the conservatives’ refusal to adapt to the changes that had taken 
root in politics served as the basis for the GOP’s conflict.  
The dueling opinions of the right and left posed a challenge for Eisenhower once he 
committed to politics. Each side labeled the other as radical, to which Eisenhower remarked, “I 
believe that the true radical is the fellow who is standing in the middle and battling both 
extremes.”77 Pragmatism and experience influenced Eisenhower’s domestic and foreign policy 
decisions, not what one perspective dictated. Unwilling to strictly adhere to the party line, 
Eisenhower encountered resistance when he tried to work with fellow Republicans, which 
ultimately limited the party’s success, even when the GOP controlled Congress between 1953 
and 1955. Although Eisenhower’s “middle way” strained his intra-party relationships, he viewed 
this method as the best response to the major political problems gripping America. Detached 
from the political fights until 1952, Eisenhower sought to have reason, not emotion, guide his 
political career. This approach would, he believed, balance the varying opinions in order to 
pursue the best policies. 
 Pushing an Elephant to the Middle of the Road 
 
Despite Republicans’ varied opinions, Eisenhower considered himself the party’s — and 
not just the moderates’ — leader. As a result, Eisenhower strove to build a GOP that, while 
conflicted, managed to work cooperatively. In a letter to lifelong friend Captain “Swede” 
Hazlett, Eisenhower wrote, “The Republicans … have what I like to call Progressive Moderates 
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and the Conservative Rightists. However, these two groups often work in unison on important 
matters, notably national security, taxes, and farm legislation, and so on.”78 This ability to move 
past differences, however, was “overshadowed” by public intra-party conflicts that plagued 
Eisenhower during the 1952 campaign and throughout his administration.79  One of 
Eisenhower’s early tests as party leader came as Senator Joseph McCarthy’s efforts to root out 
communists, or sympathizers, in the government and Army. Eisenhower planned a public 
defense of George C. Marshall, former Chief of Staff and his mentor, during a 1952 campaign 
stop in Wisconsin, but cut it at the suggestion of advisers. McCarthy’s actions continued, and 
moderate Republicans grew tired of McCarthy’s tactics, but conservatives remained committed 
to the communist hunter. Members of the GOP wanted Eisenhower to intervene, utilizing the 
power of his office to silence McCarthy, but he did not want to diminish his office by stooping to 
McCarthy’s level. The president decided to let events unfold, with Senate Republicans 
eventually censuring McCarthy in 1954. Eisenhower lamented the fact that the party’s clashes 
“have come to mean ‘Republicanism’ to far too many people.”80 Eisenhower knew that as 
president he represented the GOP and that he, first and foremost, could alter perceptions of the 
party.  
 Even before Eisenhower made it into the White House he sought to correct the fractured 
state of his party. After receiving word that he would represent the GOP in the 1952 election, 
Eisenhower paid a brief visit to his former opponent, Senator Taft.81 Despite representing 
different wings of their party and continuing to disagree on certain policies, particularly 
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international affairs, the foes became friends.82 Eisenhower once described Taft as his “principal 
adviser on all matters affecting labor.”83 Before Taft died in July 1953, the senator proved 
especially helpful in rallying Republicans to support legislation. Taft’s assistance gave 
Eisenhower the chance to use the slim congressional majority the GOP secured in 1952 — by 
one vote in the Senate and six in the House.84  
 Members of the right and left resisted many of the legislative proposals that Eisenhower 
supported, but he did make inroads with Congress. On October 26, 1953, Bryce Harlow, 
congressional liaison, prepared a memo for Eisenhower that evaluated the president’s 
performance to date. In less than a year, Eisenhower endured only a few defeats, and Harlow 
noted that  
Congress approved, without destructive compromises, almost everything you 
asked, including such historic Republican abominations as foreign aid, admission 
of aliens, extension of excess profits tax, public housing, extension of 
[R]eciprocal [T]rade [A]greements Act, and increased authority for the Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Many Republican Congressmen who for years have voted 
against such programs supported them — and you — this year.85 
 
Harlow’s report may appear to spin matters for Eisenhower, but he followed up the positive 
report with a frank discussion of the persistence of the voters’ negative view of Republicans. To 
remedy this problem, Harlow suggested that Eisenhower and the GOP pursue popular economic 
initiatives, including the expansion of social security, and “publicize such actions far and wide so 
Mr. John Q. Public will lose his fear of being despoiled by the Republican Party.”86 And indeed, 
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millions would benefit from a piece of legislation that passed during the next session of Congress 
— the Social Security Amendments Act. When Eisenhower signed the bill on September 1, 
1954, nearly ten million Americans became newly eligible for Social Security benefits.87 
Citizens celebrated the expansion of the popular program, but the positive reaction did not 
translate to votes for Republicans a few weeks later in the November 1954 midterm elections. 
When the votes were tallied, Republicans went from a six seat edge in the House to a thirty vote 
disadvantage, and the one vote controlling the Senate switched from the GOP to the 
Democrats.88 
 The returns in the 1954 midterm elections served as a major indicator that the electorate’s 
support for Eisenhower diverged from support for other Republicans. On the surface, the wins in 
the 1952 presidential and congressional elections marked progress for the GOP. However, 
analysis of the numbers of how many voters supported Eisenhower versus other Republicans 
demonstrated a clear gap between the two. Across the country, Eisenhower enjoyed a greater 
margin of victory than other members of the GOP.89 Although voters expressed a willingness to 
cross party lines and vote for Eisenhower, this did not translate to support for other Republicans. 
Concerned about how the party would fare when his name did not appear on the ballot, 
Eisenhower crisscrossed the nation and delivered nearly forty speeches to support fellow 
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Republicans. Those efforts may have minimized Republican losses, but the fact became clear — 
a wide swatch of voters hesitated to support the GOP.90  
What changed from 1952 to 1954 to cause the Republican losses? Above all, a recession 
prompted voters to carefully monitor the position of each party on fiscal matters. Historians 
credit voters’ faith in Democrats to build a strong economy as a key factor in the 1954 midterm 
elections. For Eisenhower, the results meant that unfortunately, Harlow’s prediction from 
October 1953 — “the average citizen [believes] that the Party doesn’t give a tinker’s dam about 
him and will sacrifice him on the altar of the almighty dollar. If this belief is not eradicated 
before November 1954, I think the Republican Party will be decisively repudiated at the polls” 
— came true.91 After November 1954, the GOP had two sets of election returns that indicated 
that voters liked Ike, but not necessarily other members of his party.  
 The outcome of the 1954 midterm elections prompted Eisenhower to change how he 
handled state and GOP matters. The president’s “middle way” philosophy guided him as he 
shifted from working with his own party to congressional Democrats. Differences between the 
parties held up legislation, and Eisenhower grew frustrated with the partisan bickering that 
seemed to supersede protecting the interests of the country.92 If Eisenhower needed another 
reason to strengthen the GOP and help the Republicans win in 1956, he had one. When not 
pulled in two different directions by Congress, Eisenhower devoted time to his role as leader of 
the Republican Party.  
 As the face of a conflicted, long-defeated party, Eisenhower faced an almost 
insurmountable task when he joined the GOP and determined the Republicans needed to move 
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closer to the middle. However, Eisenhower realized that his presidency could serve as a turning 
point for the party. Before the losses in 1954, Eisenhower received a message from Edward J. 
Bermingham, a Columbia University trustee and member of the Republican National Committee, 
which remarked that “the sorry congressional results achieved in 1952, and hardly better in 1950, 
are convincing that the planning and strategy of the committee must be completely overhauled. 
We lost consistently for 20 years because we had been working from the same utterly antiquated 
pattern.”93 Eisenhower concurred with Bermingham’s assessment that the GOP needed to 
change. As a result, Eisenhower embarked on efforts to realign the party with the “middle way.” 
 The strategy that Eisenhower developed for the GOP hinged on two factors — ideology 
and organization. Only when the latter component garnered strength for the former could the 
Republicans have a coherent party structure that supported a specific perspective. Eisenhower 
articulated this plan to friend and CBS president William Paley in 1956: 
I agree thoroughly with your thesis that if the Republican Party is to establish 
itself as a dominant influence in American life, it must do two things. First, it 
must adopt and live by a philosophy of government that I call ‘Modern 
Republicanism’ and it must convince all America that it does live and act by this 
philosophy. Secondly, it must organize itself far better than it has in the past, 
particularly at the precinct, district and county levels.94 
 
By following this approach, Eisenhower hoped to begin the reconfiguration of the GOP at its 
core, not the top of the organization. Given that he was elected with the assistance of Citizens for 
Eisenhower groups, a network to reach out to voters on the ground level already existed. Turning 
support for the president into support for the GOP proved difficult, and Eisenhower relied upon 
the pre-existing support groups. Although separate from the Republican National Committee, 
pro-Eisenhower associations could supplement the GOP’s official campaign activities.   
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 Strengthening the ranks of the Republicans entailed more than boosting the party’s 
numbers. Leadership, from the local to the national level, needed to be developed. Acutely aware 
of the limitations imposed on him by the twenty-second amendment’s term limits and his own 
mortality, Eisenhower wanted to clearly identify the next chief representative of moderate 
Republicanism. Furthermore, the president wanted to cultivate a whole group of leaders, thereby 
ensuring that the GOP would continue to follow the “middle way” for generations. One key 
improvement Eisenhower oversaw was training and supporting party leaders. Through different 
publications and occasional workshops, top Republicans worked to establish a more cohesive 
identity for the GOP and strengthen connections within the organization.95  
 Despite some progress, Eisenhower’s efforts as party leader while president yielded 
limited results for the Republicans. Democrats remained in control of Congress for the last six 
years of Eisenhower’s presidency, and the right continued to reject the “middle way.” The efforts 
to restructure the Republican Party during the 1950s have received scant attention, largely due to 
Eisenhower’s ultimate failure to establish a moderate party, but that did not mean that his efforts 
had no effect on the GOP. In Presidential Party Building, political scientist Daniel Galvin notes 
that “while Eisenhower was not ‘successful’ in the sense that he did not produce the new Modern 
Republican consensus he sought, his party-building efforts proved to be of real consequence for 
the Republican Party’s organizational development.”96 Eisenhower may not have accomplished 
his ultimate goal of a moderate GOP, but he did give his faction a fighting chance against the 
increasingly powerful conservatives. After all, Nixon’s ties to Eisenhower would factor into the 
1968 election, and Nixon pledged to win for the ailing Ike. Given the state of the Republican 
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Party when Eisenhower joined in 1952, his ability to leave behind a party with improved 
organization merits recognition. 
The link between Eisenhower and moderate Republicanism during the 1950s proved 
close, with the thirty-fourth president’s name becoming synonymous with the perspective. If 
Eisenhower had had his way, however, Americans would have considered him merely one of 
several leading moderates. Certain that the “middle way” was the best path for America, 
Eisenhower committed to the perspective in 1952. Some followed the president, but other 
Republicans preferred to stay on the right side of the road during the 1950s. Six years of a 
Democratic Congress further strained the GOP during the Eisenhower administration. 
Conservatives’ disapproval of Eisenhower only escalated after 1952, and reached the point of 
frequent public questioning of their party’s president by 1960. Undeterred, Eisenhower remained 
focused on shaping the future of the Republican Party, which he hoped would start with Richard 
Nixon winning the 1960 presidential election. 
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Chapter 2 - Tearing an Elephant Apart: 
The Fight to Control the Post-Eisenhower GOP 
One of President Eisenhower’s central motives for encouraging Republicans to follow the 
“middle way” was the long-term viability of the GOP. Moderate Republicanism, in Eisenhower’s 
mind, would attract new voters to the party. If no one emerged to lead the moderates after 
Eisenhower, though, his efforts would be in vain. Amid the files Eisenhower left behind is an 
undated page that features doodles, a drawing of a piece of pie, and three lists. On the left hand 
side of the page, Eisenhower listed “Possibilities Those I’d support actively.” On the right side, 
three names are written under “Disqualified, by family, religion or [unintelligible] or age.” And 
underneath the two lists, Eisenhower included the ideal roster for “Americans for Modern 
Republicanism A. M. R.” Between his drawings, Eisenhower recorded who he wanted to shape 
the future of the GOP, and Richard Nixon’s name appears at the top of the “Possibilities” and 
“A. M. R.” lists.97 Because the page is undated, it is unknown at which stage of his presidency 
Eisenhower jotted down these thoughts. But regardless, the lists demonstrate Eisenhower’s faith 
in Nixon’s ability to take the elephant’s reins and lead the next generation of Republicans.  
The twenty-second amendment, passed after Roosevelt’s unprecedented presidency, 
prohibited Eisenhower from running for a third term, and the 1960 presidential election would 
test moderate Republicanism and the GOP’s ability to win the White House without Eisenhower. 
The outgoing president believed that his vice president was capable of succeeding him and 
extending the administration’s central policies for at least four more years. Nixon had originally 
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landed on Eisenhower’s ticket because of his conservative ties, but, by 1960, those had faded. 
Historian Jonathan Schoenwald described Nixon as “more politician than man, a chameleon 
eager to please,” and David Farber noted that during the 1960 campaign “Nixon did not run as a 
conservative. He hewed to the moderate Republicanism of President Eisenhower.”98 Members of 
the right wing recognized Nixon’s shift to the middle and looked to the man who had stepped 
into Senator Robert Taft’s role as the GOP’s conservative leader — Senator Barry Goldwater. 
Aided by the success of his ghostwritten The Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater emerged 
as a challenger for the 1960 nomination.99 After Nixon narrowly lost the election to Senator John 
F. Kennedy, members of the right sought to build even more support for Goldwater with an eye 
toward the 1964 nomination. The outcome of Nixon’s presidential campaign, according to 
Michael Bowen, “marked the final turning point in the sixteen-year-old factional conflict and 
signaled the ascension of the strong conservatives.”100 Moderate Republicanism had failed to 
take root as Eisenhower hoped, and the ideological future of the GOP appeared uncertain after 
1960. If Eisenhower wanted the Republicans to stay with the “middle way,” he would have to 
work on behalf of the GOP throughout his supposed retirement years.  
Historians drop Eisenhower from the Republicans’ story after he leaves office in January 
1961. In most analyses, Eisenhower’s political life ended the moment Kennedy took office, 
thereby ignoring years of work done as the GOP’s elder statesman. “With Eisenhower having 
retreated to the remoteness of Gettysburg,” historian Geoffrey Kabaservice wrote, for example, 
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“the party was adrift” when Kennedy moved into the White House.101 At the conclusion of his 
study of conservatism, Bowen stated: “From late 1960 through November 1964, the 
conservatives took advantage of Eisenhower’s exit from public life and a general change among 
the liberal Republicans to take control of the Republican apparatus.”102 Yet, as this chapter 
shows, the general may have retired, but he did not stage a retreat. After 1960, as Kabaservice 
noted, “the stage was set for civil war between the party’s moderate and conservative factions,” 
but Eisenhower does not receive credit for serving as a leader of the moderates’ fight.103 Beneath 
the radar even to many historians today, Eisenhower settled into the role of elder statesman and 
quietly worked with the upper levels of the party to encourage potential moderate candidates and 
continue to push the Republicans toward the “middle way.”  
Eisenhower moved into the White House a reluctant politician, but, by the time he left in 
1961, the general had turned into a party leader. The ex-president did not want to witness the 
downfall of moderate Republicanism, and this campaign would define the latter half of his 
political life.  This chapter will first analyze Eisenhower’s role in Nixon’s campaigns, first for 
president in 1960, and then for Governor of California in 1962. For Eisenhower, a Nixon 
presidency would have helped the moderates sustain the momentum that they had developed 
during the 1950s. After Nixon’s failed gubernatorial run in 1962, Eisenhower turned his focus to 
the 1964 presidential campaign. The chapter will then analyze Eisenhower’s behind the scenes 
efforts to have a moderate Republican receive the GOP’s nomination. Still, when the 
conservative Barry Goldwater became the party’s nominee, Eisenhower, whom Goldwater had 
criticized publicly, tried to assist the candidate for the benefit of the GOP. Even though he 
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disagreed with Goldwater, Eisenhower, committed to his role as party leader, respected the 
outcome of the primaries and the nominating convention, and endorsed his party’s rightful 
candidate.  Eisenhower recognized the tumultuous nature of this period and sought to keep the 
GOP together, but ultimately he failed to halt the shift in power to the conservatives. 
 Eisenhower, Nixon, and the Uncertain Sixties 
 
Eisenhower suffered from a heart attack in September 1955, and although he recovered 
by the end of the fall, this event signaled the fragility of the president’s health and reminded 
Republicans that he would not always be around to lead them to victory. During the president’s 
recovery, Vice President Nixon stepped in to assist with the president’s responsibilities, which 
included leading meetings of the cabinet and the National Security Council. However, as 
Republicans looked to the future and Eisenhower’s bid for reelection, the fact that Nixon stood 
just a heartbeat away from the presidency assumed greater significance. The president’s chief of 
staff, Sherman Adams, and the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, ranked among the top 
Republicans worried about the prospect of Nixon taking over for Eisenhower. Nixon had 
cooperated with Eisenhower thus far, but moderate officials remained skeptical of Nixon’s 
conservative reputation. More so than in 1952, Eisenhower’s running mate for 1956 needed to be 
able to quickly and effectively take on the role of president. Moderates’ concerns about Nixon 
lingered after Eisenhower’s health crisis, and Eisenhower even considered moving Nixon from 
the vice presidency to a cabinet position in 1956. For all of Eisenhower’s doubts, though, he also 
had examples of Nixon effectively working with Republicans.104 When Nixon remained on the 
ticket, the decision put him on the path to the Oval Office. Either Nixon would take 
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Eisenhower’s place in an emergency or he would likely receive the GOP’s presidential 
nomination in 1960.  Nixon, more so than any other Republican, enjoyed the status of heir 
apparent as the GOP looked to the future.  
 Especially after the 1956 election, Nixon himself worked to position himself as the 
GOP’s next presidential candidate. Despite the vice president’s history with the conservative 
wing, he sought to align himself with the popular moderate, Eisenhower.105 Reporter Lyle 
Wilson noted Nixon’s efforts in May 1957, describing Nixon’s repeated use of “we” in a recent 
speech as “Mr. Nixon deliberately t[ying] himself in that speech to the Eisenhower 
administration. T[ying] himself and soak[ing] the knot in water so that it will not become 
untied.”106 Nixon’s decision to link himself to Eisenhower “probably has cost him some warmth 
and friendship among the large body of Republican conservatives,” but, according to Wilson, the 
move helped establish Nixon as “Mr. Eisenhower’s boy—provided the President wants him three 
years hence.”107 Wilson’s final comment would prove prophetic, as Eisenhower’s efforts to help 
Nixon win would unravel in 1960 courtesy of an offhand remark about Nixon’s contribution to 
the administration.  
 Eisenhower approached the Nixon 1960 campaign as an extension of his efforts to 
strengthen modern Republicanism. A key element of both efforts was attracting new voters and 
closing the gap between registered Democrats and Republicans. In December 1958, Eisenhower 
and Nixon collaborated on an action plan not only for the campaign but also for the GOP. The 
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duo analyzed “Republican difficulties and failures,” in Eisenhower’s words, and devised a six-
point plan for success.108 Among the priorities listed were initiatives to analyze the results of the 
1958 elections to determine the GOP’s weak points, all the way down to the county level. 
Eisenhower and Nixon also recognized the need to align the views of the president, Republican 
National Committee, and congressional or senatorial committees, otherwise GOP officials would 
risk contradicting one another. Ultimately, however, the work hinged upon whether or not the 
GOP had, in Eisenhower’s opinion, “the finest possible candidates.”109 For Eisenhower, Nixon 
was the GOP’s top prospect for the 1960 campaign.  
 Although Eisenhower believed in Nixon, elements of the GOP — especially 
conservatives who did not want moderate Republicanism to continue — opposed the vice 
president’s candidacy. As 1960 neared, Eisenhower sought to limit intra-party conflict before it 
cost Nixon either the nomination or the election. Not long after Eisenhower and Nixon devised 
their plans for the campaign, the president wrote to his friend Clifford Roberts about the GOP’s 
issues. “Dick and I have found that everyone seems to have his own individualistic ideas as to 
what is the most important thing for the Republican Party now to do,” Eisenhower wrote in 
December 1958.110 To court fellow Republicans, Eisenhower planned to meet with “a few Party 
stalwarts” and “a couple professional pollsters” with the ultimate goal of creating “some kind of 
outside committee to investigate past difficulties and defects and to help develop and design a 
forward-looking program.”111 Rather than fighting to maintain the GOP’s traditional image as 
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the party of small government, Eisenhower sought to foster an image of the Republicans as a 
forward-looking party uninterested in reversing the New Deal.  
 For conservatives, the platform Eisenhower pursued and encouraged Nixon to adopt 
clashed with Republican ideology. Faced with the prospect of at least four more years of a 
moderate Republican president, some conservatives opposed Nixon’s candidacy. The differences 
among Republicans even permeated the Eisenhower family. On May 2, 1960, almost three 
months before Nixon received the GOP’s nomination, the president’s sister-in-law, Lucy 
Eisenhower, wrote to inform him that “we here on the West Coast are extremely concerned and 
disappointed in Dick Nixon’s liberal me-too attitude as compared to that of the Democratic 
candidates. We are asking ourselves, ‘The candidates are all so liberal and alike, what difference 
does it make which one we vote for?’”112 Mrs. Eisenhower’s remarks are representative of 
conservatism’s strength in the West and the right’s assessment of Nixon. Conservatives 
remembered Nixon’s anticommunist work during his senatorial career and respected his foreign 
affairs work, which included challenging Nikita Khrushchev in the famous 1959 “kitchen 
debate” in Moscow. However, Nixon’s support for Social Security, international aid programs, 
and civil rights (to a moderate degree) kept him distanced from the right.113 For conservatives, 
Nixon’s actions did more to prove his affiliation with the moderates than their wing of the GOP.  
 Upset by Nixon’s moderate platform, conservatives looked elsewhere for a candidate. 
After she told Eisenhower about conservatives’ issues with Nixon, Lucy Eisenhower proposed 
Senator Barry Goldwater as an alternative candidate. Even if Goldwater did not receive the 
presidential nomination, Lucy explained, having him as Nixon’s running mate would serve to 
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balance the ticket with a moderate and a conservative.114 Eisenhower prepared an eight-page 
response to his sister-in-law’s comments on the state of the GOP. In regards to Nixon though, 
Eisenhower kept his remarks brief, stating that “the country must be made to see the difference 
between Nixon and any one of his prospective opponents and that it should rally to the cause of 
the policies and philosophies that he espouses.”115 By the 1960 election, Nixon had moved far 
enough away from the right that Eisenhower considered him to be the best candidate for the GOP 
and the country.  
 Eisenhower’s support for Nixon would be questioned just a few weeks later, though, 
because with just one news conference, Eisenhower managed to set back the work that he, 
Nixon, and other moderates had done for years. In August 1960, a reporter asked Eisenhower to 
“cite one major Nixon idea he had adopted,” and the president replied by stating: “If you give me 
a week, I might think of one. I can’t remember.”116 Associated Press reporter James Marlow 
described the moment, noting that Eisenhower “said he alone has made the decisions since 
becoming president. He did say he considered Nixon a trusted adviser.”117 Even though 
Eisenhower did mention Nixon’s advisory role, Marlow concluded that the remarks took away 
one of Nixon’s key campaigning points.118 Nixon used his time as vice president to argue that he, 
not Kennedy, was prepared for the presidency. When the president struck down the idea that 
Nixon played a major role in policy decisions, the vice president lost an edge he had against 
Kennedy. Democrats made sure to repeat Eisenhower’s words throughout the rest of the 
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campaign, including a television spot, and often reminded voters of the president’s doubts about 
Nixon.  
 Why did the president answer questions about his vice president with those remarks? 
Historian Lewis Gould writes that the response “may have reflected some of Eisenhower’s 
private doubts about his vice president.”119 In other words, the remark might have been a case of 
Eisenhower slipping up in public and revealing his lack of full faith in Nixon. Then again, as Jim 
Newton argues in Eisenhower: The White House Years, historians may misinterpret the 
exchange. In fact, Eisenhower simply may have been joking. Newton notes, “Ike delivered that 
with a smile and insisted afterward that he’d been joshing, not that he had delivered the 
withering insult that it appeared.”120 Regardless of intention, Eisenhower’s words haunted Nixon, 
particularly after Kennedy won the election. 
Rather than severing political ties after 1960, Eisenhower continued to work with Nixon, 
offering advice and support to his former vice president. The first major test of the altered, post–
White House dynamic between the two occurred when Nixon contemplated a gubernatorial run 
in California. With the future of not only Nixon but also the GOP in mind, Eisenhower offered 
his thoughts on the subject in a September, 1961 letter to Nixon, writing: 
If you run and win, as I believe you can, you offset to a large extant the razor-thin 
margin by which you lost the Presidential race last November. Finally, I see no 
reason why, if you are elected Governor, you cannot, if you wish, make the 1964 
Presidential race — and I think you would be in a far more powerful position as 
Governor, controlling a large delegation, than otherwise.121  
 
As Eisenhower encouraged Nixon to run for governor in 1962, he also pushed Nixon to stay 
politically active nationally and to remain a viable (and moderate) presidential candidate. If 
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Nixon could follow up his narrow defeat in 1960 with a victory in California in 1962, 
Eisenhower insisted, the former vice president stood a chance of winning the Republican 
nomination two years later, particularly against the perceived firebrand conservative Goldwater.  
 Despite having Eisenhower’s support, Nixon lost California’s gubernatorial election in 
1962. The divisions in the GOP and a popular incumbent, Democrat Pat Brown, proved too 
formidable.122 Before the campaign ended, the former president explained that “I am vitally 
interested in Dick’s election and I do wish that there were something more that I could do, but 
one individual cannot be everywhere at once.”123 Restricted by health and other commitments, 
however, Eisenhower could not engage in the rigorous public campaigning that might have 
helped Nixon achieve victory. The GOP did gain a few seats in the House in the 1962 midterm 
elections, but it remained the minority party. In response to these elections, Eisenhower wrote to 
friend Charles Jones, revealing that “actually I wouldn’t be too disappointed with the over-all 
results of the election except for the defeat of Dick,” because he believed Nixon “would have 
added some vitality and wisdom to the high councils of the Party.”124 Eisenhower’s participation 
in Nixon’s two early-1960s campaigns demonstrated that he considered Nixon important to the 
Republicans. Even though Nixon once aligned with the conservatives, he had moved to the 
center just enough to fall in with the top moderate Republicans. Throughout the next few years, 
Eisenhower’s favorable opinion of Nixon persisted, and the ex-president never stopped 
considering Nixon’s future with the GOP.  
 Eisenhower’s Turn as the Man behind the Curtain 
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Just as Eisenhower retired and moved to Gettysburg, the civil war that Republicans 
managed to avoid for years finally erupted. Years of resentment and marginalization, including 
Eisenhower’s presidency, prompted conservatives to make a grab for power after 1960. A few 
weeks into his retirement, Eisenhower wrote to former assistant Bryce Harlow to discuss the 
GOP’s future. Concerned about the labels being applied to the party, Eisenhower wanted the 
Republicans to move away from the image of the party of the past. “The United States does not 
want to think of us as a complacent unimaginative and reactionary party,” Eisenhower 
explained.125 He then advised, “If we are too much captivated by the word ‘conservative,’ which 
in itself is a good word, we will, I fear, create an impression that will be unfortunate every time 
we go to the polls because of the erroneous meaning that the public is apt to read into it.”126 
Given the stalemate between the moderate and conservative factions, Eisenhower recognized that 
Republicans needed to refine their image moving forward, or risk solidifying its status as the 
minority party.  
 Chances for the GOP’s factions to collaborate diminished from 1961 onward. After the 
attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro’s communist government in Cuba in 1961 failed with the Bay 
of Pigs invasion, many Republicans blamed President Kennedy. Yet Eisenhower did not escape 
criticism over the matter because initial plans for action against Cuba were drawn up during his 
presidency. After writing to Major General Wilton “Jerry” Persons about Kennedy and Cuba, 
Eisenhower added this postscript: “To top it all — I have a clipping of a Goldwater column that 
refers to the ‘inept Eisenhower Administration in Cuba’ affair — who is he to be such a 
                                                 
125 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Bryce Harlow, February 23, 1961, Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Special Name 
Series, Box 6, Folder: “Harlow, Bryce, 1961 (4).” 
126 Ibid. 
40 
 
genius??”127 Public intra-party attacks weakened the GOP and pitted the moderates against the 
conservatives. Goldwater did not hesitate to criticize Eisenhower, but such criticisms served to 
further motivate Eisenhower to halt the rise of conservatism.  
 Amidst the right’s efforts to build their support base, moderates organized the National 
Republican Citizens Committee (NRCC). This new group, established in 1962 during a meeting 
of Republican leaders in Pennsylvania, did not explicitly aim to promote one GOP faction or 
candidate over another. Rather, the NRCC emphasized recruiting efforts. Historian Kabaservice 
described the group “as a means of addressing the GOP’s failure to harness the energies of the 
grassroots citizens’ organizations that had sprouted and then been allowed to whither after the 
presidential elections from 1952 to 1960.”128 Still, the organization’s efforts indicate that it 
favored the moderates. And yet by 1962, right-wing citizens groups thrived, but the moderate 
ones struggled. Eisenhower, who acted as the Honorary Chairman of the NRCC, once wrote that 
“the biggest job I see for the Citizens Committee is to make itself a bridge across which 
Independents and smart Democrats can eventually get into the Republican sector.”129 
Conservatives had no interest in adopting a program that catered to recruiting Independents or 
Democrats, another indication that the NRCC actually supported only certain Republicans.  
 Important for the present discussion, the NRCC helped Eisenhower work on his plans for 
the Republicans. Still committed to recruiting and identifying leaders, Eisenhower collaborated 
with other members of the NRCC to achieve these goals. However, working with the NRCC 
ultimately proved difficult for Eisenhower. Despite its stated intention of uniting the GOP, the 
group seemed to achieve the opposite. Conservatives, particularly Goldwater, took issue with the 
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group, labeling it as divisive group and another moderate initiative that would ruin the party. 
Thus rather than helping the GOP, the NRCC only served to intensify the party’s divide.130 
As a result of the mixed reaction to the NRCC, Eisenhower declined offers to join other 
Republican groups. In 1965, Eisenhower explained to The New York Herald Tribune’s Walter 
Thayer, who helped organize the NRCC, that back in 1962 he “enthusiastically supported the 
idea of The Republican Citizens organization, but this was because of the complete vacuum that 
seemed to be developing in analyzing problems of the day and organizing Republican support for 
resulting conclusions.”131 When the NRCC only further divided the Republicans, Eisenhower 
lost faith in the organization and distanced himself from other potentially detrimental efforts.
 Eisenhower hoped to use initiatives like the NRCC to help the GOP achieve success in 
1964, not only on the national level but also in state elections. However, an organization that 
ultimately favored one faction over another would not help the divided Republican Party mount 
successful campaigns in 1964. A few months after the founding of the NRCC, Eisenhower 
discussed the fractious GOP in a letter to Bryce Harlow. Despite favoring the moderate faction, 
Eisenhower explained his position on the impending campaign. “I would be most unhappy to see 
a real schism and a virtual civil war eventuate,” he wrote, “we simply must remember that the 
Republican Party has unity on such basic things as integrity, fiscal sanity and responsible 
progress throughout the nation. To allow ourselves to become divided on smaller things would 
be bad.”132 Rather than risk pushing the GOP’s wings apart even more, Eisenhower opted to shift 
strategy in 1963. Stepping away from polarizing public roles, such as his prominent position with 
the NRCC, Eisenhower opted to work quietly with Republican strategists and candidates.  
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After Nixon lost in 1960, Eisenhower conferred not only with his former vice president 
but also with other individuals who could potentially lead the GOP. One individual who caught 
Eisenhower’s attention in 1962 was a political newcomer running for governor in Michigan—
George Romney. After leaving his post as president of American Motors, Romney did not shy 
away from controversial projects, including a rewrite of Michigan’s state constitution. The 
mixture of tradition and progressivism that Romney represented made him a dynamic figure 
within the GOP. Deeply committed to his Mormon faith, Romney acknowledged that religion 
influenced him, but he emphasized that he did not base decisions solely on Mormon doctrine. 
Romney’s support for civil rights marked one issue where he differed from the church, as 
Mormons did not permit African Americans to be ministers until the late 1970s. As for the 
businesspersons who long supported the moderates, they could enjoy the opportunity to work 
with someone who understood the intricacies of American industry.133 Moderate Republicans 
celebrated the new politician, and Eisenhower finally had a promising new moderate to work 
with.  
Eisenhower never wanted the burden of leading the GOP to fall on one person’s 
shoulders, whether his or Nixon’s. Romney’s emergence on the political scene offered 
Eisenhower the opportunity to share the leadership burden with another Republican. In the early 
stages of Romney’s candidacy, Eisenhower reached out to the former businessman. “I have been 
trying to read everything you have had to say for public consumption and have been pondering 
some ideas of a political nature that I would like to bring to your attention,” Eisenhower wrote.134 
Over the course of the letter, Eisenhower briefly discusses matters of business, voter appeal, and 
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even religion, all in an effort to help the Republican gubernatorial candidate. On the subject of 
Romney’s Mormon faith, Eisenhower first recalled when Romney explained to him that he was 
not a “strict” adherent to Mormonism.135 The general then expressed respect for Romney’s 
commitment, “deeply so — to the basic tenets of your Church,” and did not indicate concern 
over Romney’s electability because of his often maligned religion.136 Eisenhower explained to 
Romney, “I am just so delighted to see a [n]ew face coming on the political scene, the face of a 
man of obvious vitality, vigor, dedication and integrity — that I have a feeling of wanting to 
keep in fairly close touch with you and once in a while, if you find them acceptable, send you a 
note to express thoughts and ideas gleaned from a short but intensive career in politics.”137  
The cordial relationship that developed between Eisenhower and Romney is indicative of 
the political work that Eisenhower carried out during his retirement years. Even when president, 
he identified leadership as a potential future weakness for the Republicans. A new generation of 
leaders was needed for Republicanism, particularly moderate Republicanism, to thrive. Romney 
emerged as a key part of this effort, and an example of how Eisenhower wanted Republican 
leaders to have a strong local base before joining the national political scene. A great success 
story from one state could serve to inspire voters across the country, and that is what Eisenhower 
hoped would happen to Romney. “Of course you are quite well aware that if you should win by a 
substantial margin in Michigan you cannot fail to command a great deal of national attention and 
support.”138 In addition to leadership potential, Eisenhower recognized Romney as an individual 
who could help keep the fractured party together. Early in 1964, Eisenhower wrote Romney:  
I am interested in the final paragraph of your note in which you propose to try to 
unite the Republican Party in Michigan. I enthusiastically agree with your last 
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clause, “I can’t see why Republicans should be squabbling and fighting so 
vigorously, in some instances, among themselves.” The strange thing is that some 
of these people seem to be unaware of the divisive influence that is inherent in the 
use of specific labels — liberal, conservative and so on.139 
 
In Romney, Eisenhower saw a leader whose goals for a strong, united GOP aligned with his 
own.  
The 1962 midterm elections helped the Republicans identify potential participants who 
would factor into the 1964 campaign. With the GOP gaining two spots in the House but losing 
four in the Senate, the results, while not encouraging, at least indicated a competitive political 
scene.140 Elements within the GOP even viewed the 1962 elections as a success, particularly 
conservatives. In the South, conservative Republicans gained seats. Nationwide, many moderates 
either lost — as seen in Nixon’s gubernatorial run in California — or, in the case of New York’s 
Governor Nelson Rockefeller, won by a narrow margin.141  
With the right gaining momentum and the moderates losing power, Eisenhower, from 
1963 onward, regularly conversed with other Republicans and carefully monitored the potential 
presidential candidates. The general took particular interest in several moderates — 
Pennsylvania’s Governor William Scranton, Governor Rockefeller of New York, and, of course, 
Romney. Eisenhower viewed those three men as having the greatest potential to secure a 
nomination for the moderates in 1964. Even though the general once told his former press 
secretary Jim Hagerty in mid-1963 that “he could support any of the Republican presidential 
candidates so far mentioned; any of them would be better than Kennedy,” Eisenhower definitely 
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favored certain individuals.142 During meetings with representatives for Rockefeller and Senator 
Goldwater, for example, Eisenhower “advised them that he is interested in policies, programs 
and winning.”143 Given Rockefeller’s ties to the moderates, there was no contest for 
Eisenhower’s support when he was pitted against Goldwater. Even though he did not share 
Eisenhower’s perspective, the Republican with the most momentum as the 1964 campaign 
neared was Barry Goldwater.  
A familiar name surfaced in 1963 and early 1964 as the moderates continued to search 
for a standard bearer. After a June 1963 Gallup Poll indicated that Goldwater led Rockefeller, a 
member of Eisenhower’s staff made a note in Eisenhower’s appointment book, “jokingly said he 
could run for Vice President; in a deadlock convention will turn to Dick.”144 Nixon remained a 
part of GOP strategizing, both as a commentator and a potential candidate. Among the 
individuals with whom Eisenhower discussed the upcoming election, Nixon regularly appears in 
Eisenhower’s appointment records from this time period. The former vice president formally 
kept out of the campaign, though Eisenhower regarded him as a potential “dark horse” 
candidate.145 
Eisenhower and fellow moderate Republicans worked throughout the early 1960s to rally 
their faction. However, the right ultimately wrested power away from them. Following 
Goldwater’s concession to Nixon in the 1960 presidential nominating convention, conservatives 
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not only strove to build support from voters but also take control of the party’s governing 
structure. The Republican National Committee, the official leading body of the GOP, changed 
hands after 1960, and moderates were removed in favor of conservatives. Even though 
Goldwater lost in 1960, his supporters worked to create a wave of support for the conservative 
that spanned from the very bottom to the very top of the GOP.146 These efforts put Goldwater in 
position to run again in 1964. Moderates, including Eisenhower, monitored these changes within 
the party. Eisenhower observed the escalation of Goldwater’s popularity and endured criticism 
from him, both while in office and after he left. The former president worked not only to see 
Romney or another moderate nominated in 1964 but also to prevent Goldwater’s candidacy. 
Eisenhower needed to admit defeat though, and as head of his party embarked upon a tumultuous 
campaign with Goldwater once he secured the GOP’s nomination. 
 Eisenhower v. Goldwater 
 
Moving toward 1964, the Republican Party faced a battle between its past and present. 
Eisenhower and the moderates, the GOP’s traditional power holders, hoped to stop losing ground 
to the right. Goldwater and the conservatives, however, wanted years of organizing and 
recruiting to lead to gaining power within the GOP. Even though Goldwater, among others, won 
office in 1952 on Eisenhower’s coattails, not all Republicans agreed with the new president. By 
the time Eisenhower left office in 1961, Goldwater publicly criticized him and championed the 
right’s platform. Goldwater’s message struck a chord and his advocacy of a smaller government 
and greater personal choice resonated with a small but growing number of conservative voters.147 
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A fresh voice calling for a return to the GOP’s roots, Goldwater led the revived conservative 
element that had spent years fighting for greater influence. 
For Eisenhower, Goldwater’s ascendancy meant that conservative challenges bookended 
his career. First Taft and the conservatives fought the Republicans’ nomination of Eisenhower in 
1952, and, by 1960, Goldwater and the new members of the right rejected Eisenhower’s policies. 
Former Eisenhower advisor Bryce Harlow once said that Goldwater supporters “never accepted 
Eisenhower as a Republican.”148 The contentious relationship between Goldwater and 
Eisenhower hindered the Republicans’ 1964 presidential campaign. When Eisenhower failed to 
block Goldwater from receiving the nomination, he worked with the conservative out of 
obligation to the party. Goldwater’s candidacy in 1964 challenged Eisenhower’s efforts to 
strengthen moderate Republicanism and threatened the fragile unity holding the GOP together.  
A central component to understanding Eisenhower and Goldwater’s tumultuous 
relationship during the 1960s is the difference between what the two said publicly and privately. 
Goldwater did not hesitate to criticize Eisenhower and demonstrate to the public that the party’s 
infighting involved leading Republicans. However, in private, Goldwater and Eisenhower 
attempted to work together. Throughout Eisenhower’s appointment books from this era are 
several notations of meetings, either in person or on the phone, between the two. These meetings 
were tense, as evidenced by occasional notations on Eisenhower’s reactions to such meetings, 
but the two at least took that step.149 Eisenhower, meanwhile, supported Goldwater after the 
senator received the Republican nomination. The general lacked enthusiasm on the campaign 
                                                 
148 Anonymous Memo, April 14, 1964, Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Special Name Series, Box 7, Folder: 
“Harlow, Bryce, 1963 (3).” 
149 See Eisenhower Library, Appointment Book Series.  
48 
 
trail, particularly when his remarks are compared to the strong comments he privately made in 
opposition to Goldwater.  
After Goldwater’s run for the presidential nomination in 1960, moderates, including 
Eisenhower, knew that Goldwater would be a leading contender in 1964. Eisenhower sought to 
limit his public efforts to find someone to nominate in 1964 other than Goldwater, but the NRCC 
complicated that effort. Goldwater did not hesitate to share his disapproval of the group and 
argue that the NRCC contributed to the intra-party tension.150 After the founding of the NRCC, 
Eisenhower used a letter to vent some of his frustration. Upset by the GOP’s splintering and 
criticism of his limited schedule, Eisenhower wrote to friend Charles Jones in July 1962 that “all 
this is complicated this morning by an outburst from Goldwater.”151 “I am getting awfully sick of 
him,” Eisenhower wrote. 152 He continued,  
I’m beginning to feel that he is nursing this one ambition — to get the Republican 
nomination for the Presidency as the crowning achievement of his career. I am 
quite certain that he has no illusions he could be elected. But regardless of his 
intentions and motives, what is really annoying is that he wants to set himself up 
as the single authority and guiding voice for the Republican Party.153 
 
After directly criticizing Goldwater, Eisenhower concluded his letter by revealing, “Sometimes I 
think it is almost hopeless to get Republicans working reasonably well together.”154 
Even before the campaign really started, Eisenhower resisted working with Goldwater and the 
conservatives, let alone entertaining the thought that Goldwater might receive the party’s 
nomination in 1964.  
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 Despite Eisenhower assisting moderate candidates, Goldwater continued to move toward 
the nomination as the campaign progressed in 1963 and 1964. Given Goldwater’s willingness to 
criticize Eisenhower, the senator’s tough fight with fellow potential Republican nominees only 
intensified as the primaries approached. The tone of the campaign troubled Eisenhower, and in 
an October 31, 1963 letter, he confided to Major General Persons, “I am not sure that the early 
start which the Republicans are getting on the 1964 convention is the best thing for the Party. I’m 
afraid that they are going to cut each other up so badly that all Mr. Kennedy will have to do is sit 
on the side lines and laugh.”155 Republicans managed to overcome factional differences in the 
past presidential campaigns, but even appearing united proved difficult. A major setback 
occurred when Goldwater managed to win the California primary. Eisenhower reportedly then 
said: “We have lost a major battle and may be a decisive one. I don’t see how with this man we 
can carry more than ½ the states.”156 With California going to Goldwater, the chaotic field turned 
decisively in the conservative’s favor.  
 After Goldwater secured the nomination, Eisenhower worked to help his fellow 
Republican. More willing to communicate with Goldwater once he officially represented the 
GOP as the presidential candidate, Eisenhower took interest in improving Goldwater’s polarizing 
image. During a candid phone conversation two weeks after Goldwater received the GOP’s 
nomination on July 15th, the general told him that “some people feel that those surrounding you 
have horns and tails and will cut down everyone who doesn’t have the same horns and tails.”157 
The imagery, while colorful, does capture the negative image attached to Goldwater and his 
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campaign. In an effort to seek a remedy to the GOP’s public relations problems, Eisenhower 
consulted his former press secretary Jim Hagerty and William Paley of CBS on August 3, 1964. 
The primary conclusions Eisenhower reached with Hagerty were that “many people [were] very 
trouble[d] about voting for Goldwater” and that improvement would only happen after taking 
“some rather dramatic steps.”158 The conversation with Paley reached similar conclusions. After 
Eisenhower said, “Can you give me any rationalization? I am bewildered,” Paley told the 
general, “Good deal going on that is disturbing,” and ultimately said that Goldwater needed to 
exercise more caution with his public remarks.159 Eisenhower’s concerns about Goldwater 
persisted, as reflected by an exchange on August 21, 1964 with Congressman Walter Judd (R-
Minn.). “He isn’t a very profound man or deep,” Eisenhower said, “he is better than what we 
have got [but] we have to remember that in some things he doesn’t think things through.”160 Judd 
responded to Eisenhower’s thoughts on Goldwater by explaining, “I told him ‘we have to get to 
the point of selling you not always defending you.” 161 The efforts of Eisenhower and other 
Republicans fell short, as Goldwater’s public image remained polarizing and unappealing to 
some voters. As Nixon told Eisenhower, Goldwater “has not been able to get people excited,” 
and that lack of enthusiasm resulted in a lack of votes in November.162 
Exchanges between Goldwater and Eisenhower demonstrate that while the two listened 
to what the other said, and Eisenhower sought to counsel Goldwater on administrative and policy 
concerns, the latter often did nothing more than listen to the general’s advice. On one occasion, 
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the general addressed the subject of Goldwater’s running mate in a conversation with Governor 
Scranton. A member of Eisenhower’s staff recorded the exchange, writing in the general’s 
appointment book, “[Goldwater] came to me about the Vice Presidency — I gave him several 
names — yours, Romney, Judd, Taft, Frelinghuysen. BG said Frelinghuysen was to the left. I 
always thought of him as a conservative. But it was Miller period.”163 With the presidential 
nomination out of the question, Eisenhower at least hoped to have a moderate Republican run 
with Goldwater, but the head of the Republican National Committee, New York Congressman 
William E. Miller, got the call instead.164 As for Goldwater’s stance on important issues, 
Eisenhower wanted the nominee to clarify his position on civil rights and tried to advise him on 
national security concerns.165 Even after he realized that Goldwater took little to no action based 
on his suggestions, Eisenhower continued to offer advice to the GOP’s candidate. 
 In part due to efforts to cooperate with Goldwater, Eisenhower encountered challenges 
from fellow moderates. Throughout the campaign, Eisenhower heard from individuals unhappy 
with Goldwater who believed that if the ex-president had wanted to, he could have spoken up 
and changed who represented the Republicans. Eisenhower resisted and did not interfere with 
Goldwater’s candidacy, despite his personal reservations. One of Eisenhower’s advisers wrote 
that “any overt attempt on General Ike’s part to abdicate his neutral position and engage in a 
stop-Goldwater movement would be sadly deplored.”166 Even though some viewed Eisenhower 
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as the only Republican who had the power to stop Goldwater, Eisenhower and his advisers knew 
that he could not utilize that power, regardless of how much they wanted to.  
 Eisenhower’s name did not appear on any ballots in 1964, but the party leader worked 
hard on behalf of the GOP’s candidates. Stuck between the factions, Eisenhower hoped not only 
to keep the party together but also win back the White House. Kennedy’s assassination 
ultimately shifted the 1964 election in Lyndon Johnson’s favor, however, and even these unique 
circumstances did not spare Eisenhower from criticism. “I have been busy answering letters to 
many who now — curiously enough,” Eisenhower wrote to George Humphrey, “are blaming me 
for Goldwater’s defeat. Some accuse me of supporting Johnson and the Democrats.”167 None of 
the decisions that Eisenhower made during the campaign could have pleased every Republican, 
and the retiree could not escape the political game when the GOP lost.  
 Throughout the 1964 campaign, Eisenhower worked to push aside his personal feelings 
in the interest of the Republican Party. Eisenhower could be counted among those dissatisfied 
with the party’s huge defeat in this election. Eisenhower first had to work with a politician with 
whom he disagreed and then he witnessed witness another Republican defeat. Eisenhower’s 
thoughts on the situation were recorded in his appointment book following a conversation with 
Governor Scranton. A month after the 1964 election, Eisenhower confessed: “I voted for 
Goldwater but I did not vote for him I voted for the Party,’” which was revealed after “discussing 
the fact that Goldwater believes that every vote for him in the election was a vote for 
conservatives.”168 Eisenhower knew that some Republicans, including a former adviser, defected 
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to the Democrats in 1964, and he used that as motivation to continue working on behalf of 
moderate Republicanism.169 
Angered by the events of 1964, Eisenhower swore that “if the Lord spares me for 1968 I 
am going to come out for somebody at least 18 months ahead of time. This year I tried to do 
what was decent.”170 Eisenhower believed that one reason why the GOP failed to win the 
presidency in 1964 was his reluctance to let the public know who he did or did not support. 
However, the general hoped to overcome the misstep by actively participating in the next 
presidential contest. Although his failing health limited his ability to campaign, Eisenhower 
ultimately got his wish to contribute to one last presidential contest. Moderate Republicanism 
appeared to have a chance for survival when Nixon secured the GOP’s nomination and then won 
the presidency eight years after Eisenhower hoped to turn power over to his vice president. 
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Chapter 3 - Eisenhower’s Last Stand: 
The Moderates’ Push to Win in 1968 
 After President Johnson’s overwhelming defeat of Senator Barry Goldwater in 1964, the 
primary Republican factions evaluated how to move forward. The progress the right made by 
taking control of the Republican National Committee and securing the nomination for Goldwater 
was halted in November 1964. The right’s joy over breaking the string of moderate nominees 
crashed, demonstrating that it had much work to do before becoming the GOP’s ruling faction. 
Once the right wing’s weaknesses were exposed, moderates sought to reclaim lost ground. 
Publicly, the 1964 loss weakened the Republicans. Privately, top moderates, including ex-
president Eisenhower, welcomed the opportunity to orchestrate a move back to the “middle 
way.”  
 This chapter further demonstrates how Eisenhower remained politically active during his 
retirement years. However, unlike the period from 1961 to 1964, the 1965 to 1969 timeframe 
featured a different approach from the ex-president to promoting moderate Republicanism. 
Eisenhower, who turned 74 in October 1964, suffered from steadily declining health, including 
multiple heart attacks, from this point onward. Physically restricted from campaigning and public 
appearances, Eisenhower continued to communicate with fellow Republicans in between trips to 
the golf course and spending time with his family. One member of the Eisenhower/Nixon 
administration remained engaged with the public, however. Despite his losses in 1960 and 1962, 
Nixon settled into the role of a voracious campaigner for fellow Republicans, which allowed him 
to remain engaged with party and public affairs. Following Goldwater’s defeat, Nixon embarked 
on another run for the White House with Eisenhower’s support.  
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The uncertainty over the Republican Party’s future escalated after the 1964 elections. For 
example, in The Agony of the G.O.P. 1964, written in 1965, Republican commentator Robert 
Novak stated that “rank-and-file Republican moderates and liberals stayed away on election day 
or voted for Johnson by the millions. The result was one of the great landslides of American 
political history, raising ominous question marks for the future of the Republican Party.”171 
Historian Mary Brennan offered similar analysis, writing, “In November 1964, the future 
viability of the Republican Party seemed in doubt.”172 The Republicans’ defeat in the presidential 
race could have marked a new low point for a party. However, Eisenhower and the moderates 
looked at the 1964 returns more hopefully. “The most impressive Republican winners were those 
who kept clear of the Goldwater campaign,” Novak noted, and these winners included moderate 
Governor George Romney.173  Among the few bright spots for the GOP in 1964, in other words, 
was one of Eisenhower’s key picks to lead the next generation of moderate Republicans. 
Even though conflict and minority party status plagued the GOP, the moderates and 
conservatives continued to plot the course that they wanted the Republicans to follow. Brennan 
noted, “Even before the final tallying of votes in the election, Republicans contemplated the 
future of their party. In fact, many moderates had been planning postelection rehabilitation since 
August and September. By late October, even Eisenhower was mulling over possibilities for the 
party after November.”174 As we have seen, Eisenhower hesitated to support Goldwater, 
ultimately admitting that he voted for the party, and not the candidate in November 1964.175 
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Soon after, Eisenhower delved right into his work, calling Romney on December 3, 1964 to 
discuss the GOP’s future.176 Once again, the general did not retire and retreat to Gettysburg. 
Aware that the 1968 campaign likely would be his last, Eisenhower communicated extensively 
with fellow Republican leaders in order to organize a moderate party that could thrive without 
him.177 
Thus far, this study has shown that, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, moderates and 
conservatives vied for control of the GOP. Most histories of this era emphasize 1964 as a step 
forward for the right wing, a vital point in the conservative revolution, despite (and to some 
degree because of) Goldwater’s loss. This chapter brings Eisenhower back into the story of the 
GOP between 1965 and 1969, analyzing the work he carried out before his death in March 1969. 
Although Eisenhower curtailed his efforts as party leader after 1964, he maintained his 
commitment to settling Republicans on the “middle way.”  The faction united in opposition to 
Goldwater, and benefitted from the ideological differences between moderates and the polarizing 
conservatives. These efforts and the overall recovery of the GOP were aided by outside events, 
particularly the electorate’s rejection of President Johnson. The escalation of the increasingly 
unpopular Vietnam War, the civil rights movement, and the War on Poverty’s failures turned 
different segments of the population against the Democratic administration. The chapter begins 
by analyzing the post-1964 recovery efforts, including the reorganization of the Republican 
National Committee. Then, the focus shifts to the 1968 presidential campaign, beginning with an 
analysis of the top candidates — George Romney and Richard Nixon. Finally, the chapter 
overviews the final year of Eisenhower’s life, which overlapped with Nixon’s successful 
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campaign. Eisenhower may not have actively participated in Nixon’s campaign, but his legacy 
influenced the campaign, thereby demonstrating his political power. 
 The Wounded Elephant’s Recovery 
 
The 1964 election, in Eisenhower’s opinion, marked an “over-all debacle” for the 
Republican Party, an assessment shared by politicians, journalists, and voters across the 
country.178 In the immediate aftermath of the election, journalist Arthur Krock reviewed the state 
of America’s main political parties. As he saw it, the greatest question facing the Democrats was 
what President Johnson would do with the mandate that his overwhelming victory provided him. 
Regarding the GOP, he wrote, “in the two years before the next Congressional elections the 
Republicans must evolve the answer to another question posed by yesterday’s Democratic 
landslide: How to regain identity as a coherent and responsible party of Opposition?”179 Despite 
a bleak future, the Republicans did possess the ability to recover, Krock noted. The fate of the 
party ultimately rested with two groups — “leaders who were not candidates for office in 1964,” 
particularly Eisenhower and Nixon, and “leaders of the so-called liberal wing,” including 
Rockefeller and Romney.180 In other words, Krock considered the conservatives a marginalized 
faction by this point. And, for the time being, he was correct. This section shows that the party, 
led by the moderates, would heal and rebuild substantially from 1964 to 1966, even as Johnson 
enjoyed several major policy victories launching the War on Poverty and the Great Society.  
 After the 1964 debacle, many Republicans turned to Eisenhower, the party’s elder 
statesman, for guidance. Aware of his responsibility to help Republicans, Eisenhower needed to 
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determine what role he would take in the party’s recovery. In a letter to his former treasury 
secretary, George M. Humphrey, Eisenhower wrote on November 21, 1964:  
As you can well imagine I am badgered to death by people that want me to ‘do 
something’ about the Republican Party. A great many people seem to be in a sort 
of shock, or at least bewilderment. As a result they are calling on me as a 
‘consulting doctor.’ None of this, however, has come from National Committee 
sources — rather it has come from a variety of citizens who are genuinely 
concerned with our Party.181 
 
Conservatives had little incentive to consult Eisenhower after the election. Because the right now 
held many key spots within the Republican National Committee (RNC), the party’s official 
leaders remained distant. The disconnect among top GOP officials soon led to the first 
significant post-1964 change — reorganizing the RNC. 
 According to most moderate Republicans and outside observers, if the GOP wanted to 
recover from 1964, it needed to distance itself from Goldwater. However, as historian Mary 
Brennan noted, Republicans “could not excommunicate Goldwater without risking destruction of 
the party.”182 As an alternative to dropping Goldwater, moderates focused on removing 
conservative RNC officials tied to the ill-fated campaign. In particular, if moderates could not 
get rid of Goldwater, the closest alternative would be the man he designated as RNC Chairman, 
Dean Burch.183 On this matter, Eisenhower consulted Meade Alcorn, former Chairman of the 
RNC. A member of Eisenhower’s staff summarized a conversation the two had on November 25, 
1964. Eisenhower, the entry in the general’s appointment book begins, “doesn’t think our major 
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difficulty is a chairman but Burch associated with Goldwater and he failed to disassociate 
himself from far right.”184  
 The composition of the RNC would never satisfy all Republicans, but in early 1965 party 
leaders, including a few conservatives, agreed that the organization needed new leadership.185 A 
change in power would aid the party in moving on from the 1964 results. The attention of party 
leaders, including Eisenhower, focused on Ray Bliss as a candidate to replace Burch.186  The 
former chair of the Ohio Republican Party, Bliss made a name for himself as a successful 
organizer in Ohio.187  One program that Bliss implemented in Ohio, which was then adopted by 
the GOP on a national level, was the “Big Cities” initiative, which sought to improve local party 
organizations in cities.188 Similar to Eisenhower, Bliss strictly opposed extremism in the party. 
By the time he became chairman, Bliss was determined to take “conservative ideologues” out of 
top RNC spots.189 Surprisingly, Bliss received support for the Chairmanship from across the 
GOP, including Goldwater.190 In an important step forward, then, Republicans managed to work 
together to reorganize the RNC and to select a qualified chairman with a history of strengthening 
the party.  
After Bliss became RNC Chairman, he enjoyed success in his efforts to fund Republican 
campaigns and attract new supporters. Historians credit Bliss with helping the Republicans win 
the elections of 1966. Lewis Gould wrote that Bliss “brought efficient fund-raising and 
ideological tolerance to his duties,” two strengths invaluable to a party torn apart by factions and 
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crushed by defeat. Echoing Eisenhower’s ideas, Bliss emphasized developing the GOP at the 
local level. For example, he instituted workshops and distributed materials on effective 
campaigning.191 At a time when the GOP desperately needed help, Bliss stepped in and turned 
the RNC into the leading organization that the Republicans needed.  
 The GOP’s success in the 1966 elections depended upon more than Bliss’ programs, of 
course, and Republicans benefitted from mounting dissatisfaction with Johnson’s domestic and 
foreign policies. Escalating disapproval of the war in Vietnam coupled with an inevitable 
backlash against Great Society social programs also set the stage for Republicans to gain 
ground.192 During the 1954 midterm elections, voters had believed that a Democratic Congress 
would remedy the nation’s economic problems. These attitudes reversed in the second half of the 
1960s. Historian Jonathan Schoenwald explained that elements of the Great Society “succeeded 
in antagonizing enough Americans who paid for but believed they did not benefit from its 
programs,” and that escalating racial tensions, including the riots in Watts, California in August 
1965, provided the Republicans with the opportunity to wrest power from the Democrats.193 In 
this case, conservatism’s emphasis on dismantling the welfare state proved to attract voters.  
 Republicans did not gain control of Congress after the 1966 midterm elections, but they 
did narrow the gap. Overall, the GOP gained forty-seven seats in the House and three in the 
Senate. At the state level, Republicans took eight governorships away from the Democrats.194 
The results did not mark a complete rejection of the Democrats, but they did indicate the pending 
decline of American liberalism and provided the GOP with ample hope for the future. Gould 
                                                 
191 Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 107. 
192 Robert Mason, The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 210–1.  
193 Jonathan M. Schoenwald, A Time for Choosing: The Rise of Modern American Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 156.  
194 Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties, 119.  
61 
 
noted that, “the natural balances of American politics were reasserting themselves after the one-
sided 1964 race.”195 The party not only showed it could recover from a major setback but also 
saw new figures win in the 1966 election who would reenergize the organization. One person 
who took office in 1966, Governor Ronald Reagan of California, would obviously prove 
especially important to the GOP.196  
 After the 1966 elections, Eisenhower sought to build on the GOP’s momentum in order 
to unite and strengthen the Republican Party. Once again, the greatest obstacles to Eisenhower’s 
vision were Republicans. In an effort to avoid a repeat of the 1964 debacle, Eisenhower told 
Nixon that he “hope[d] that no Republican would be calling any other Republicans bad names 
this year. They should think of the party and not themselves.”197 Furthermore, Eisenhower 
“hoped that no one would start building a personal party” in 1967, as he put it to Romney.198 
 Eisenhower’s wishes for intraparty harmony went unfulfilled in 1967. The ex-president 
expressed dismay when he learned that Republicans had already started to organize campaign 
committees. In February 1967, Eisenhower discussed the situation with Romney, and in the 
general’s appointment book, a staff member wrote that Eisenhower was “disappointed that 
candidates are starting activities,” because he believed early action left candidates vulnerable to 
criticism from inside and outside of the GOP sooner than necessary.199 The question of who 
started to campaign first led to a game of pointing fingers. Eisenhower explained the situation to 
Fred Seaton, his former secretary of the interior: 
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I truly enjoyed your letter of the eighteenth. One sentence gave me a real chuckle. 
You said, ‘However, the running start which the Romney supporters undertook 
simply forced our hand.’ This is exactly the reverse of what a Romney supporter 
wrote to me! In any event, I think nothing has been hurt; I am confident none of 
the aspirants for the nomination will do anything to destroy what is undoubtedly a 
growing unity in our Party. For this I am grateful.200 
 
Just two months into 1967, Eisenhower needed to adjust his expectations for the party’s actions. 
But when the early campaigning proved cordial, at least when compared to the 1964 election, 
Eisenhower’s worries about the party lessened. Instead of opposing the frontrunner, Eisenhower 
found himself in the pleasant position of supporting the GOP’s top two candidates, both of whom 
were moderate. Satisfied with both Romney and Nixon, Eisenhower settled into an advisory role 
during the early portion of the campaign. By doing so, the general could work with the different 
candidates and serve as an example for party unity by not openly favoring one candidate. 
 Romney and Nixon Try on Eisenhower’s Shoes 
 
The Republicans approached the 1968 presidential election uncertain of who would 
represent the party and with a physically weakened leader incapable of hitting the campaign trail, 
as he had promised to do after the 1964 debacle. In November 1965, Eisenhower suffered two 
heart attacks. He recovered, but from that time onward his physical health declined further. 
Eisenhower did not stop working, however. Limited by doctors and Mamie to brief meetings and 
correspondence, Eisenhower could only quietly exert his influence to ensure that the Republicans 
nominated a moderate for the next presidential contest.  
 In the beginning of 1967, the Republican nomination could have easily gone to different 
candidates, but the two clear favorites were men who enjoyed support from Eisenhower — 
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Governor George Romney and former vice president Richard Nixon. In the shadows stood 
Ronald Reagan, who enjoyed great support from conservatives. The turmoil of the 1960s, at 
home and abroad, caused Reagan’s message of individual responsibility and a small government 
resonated with the discontent.201  His hopes for a quiet 1967 dashed, Eisenhower wrote to 
George Humphrey on July 21, 1967, that “the political pot is beginning to boil early for the 
coming elections. Yesterday I saw a Volkswagen running about with a ‘Reagan for ‘68’ on its 
back window, while Nixon and Romney have their names in the papers almost daily.”202 For his 
part, Eisenhower focused on working with the two main declared candidates, Nixon and 
Romney.  
 After Michigan’s voters reelected him to a third term in 1966, Romney moved toward the 
1968 campaign with momentum on his side. Potential voters across the country knew Romney as 
a moderate who refused to support Goldwater in 1964.203 Despite these advantages, Romney 
quickly encountered trouble attracting national support. One of Romney’s greatest obstacles 
proved to be himself, particularly his public speaking style. A lack of confidence and propensity 
to misspeak or fail to clarify key points generally left a poor impression, and he sometimes 
lacked a full grasp of the issues.204 On March 24, 1967, Eisenhower wrote his friend Barry 
Leithead about Romney’s campaign. Concerned by reports that Romney failed to impress at 
public events, including one where, reportedly, “Reagan stole the show and Romney did just the 
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opposite,” Eisenhower confessed that he did not understand Romney’s struggles.205 Upset by 
Romney’s tendency to instill “doubt and bewilderment” in his audiences, Eisenhower tried to 
assist the Republican, telling Leithead: “I wish I knew what to tell him because I just think he is 
too good a man to be ignored this early in the contest.”206 
 As much as Romney jumbled up speaking engagements, those issues did not compare to 
his troubles mastering foreign affairs. Simply put, international politics were outside of 
Romney’s comfort zone. Jonathan Moore, who served as a foreign policy advisor to Romney, 
once remarked that even though Romney was an intelligent person, he failed to process issues 
larger than the ones he handled as governor. Kabaservice summarized Romney’s trouble 
discussing foreign affairs when he wrote that “the main flaw of Romney’s shifting perspectives 
on Vietnam … was not that he didn’t have a solution to the conflict, but that he was not 
politically sophisticated enough to pretend that he did.”207 In July 1966, Eisenhower broached 
the subject of Vietnam in a letter to Romney. At first, Eisenhower agreed with Romney’s 
remarks that, as a governor, the events in Vietnam fell outside of his traditional purview. But 
then, Eisenhower almost scolded, “no public figure today can avoid being questioned closely 
about the matter.”208 Eisenhower offered Romney the following advice, “I think you should 
develop for yourself a fairly comprehensive answer that will express accurately your personal 
views and use it every time you are questioned.”209 Briefly, Eisenhower then sketched out his 
own thoughts on the situation. Despite this assistance, Romney continued to fail to offer 
confident and competent sounding responses on foreign affairs. The general knew that Romney 
                                                 
205 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Barry Leithead, March 24, 1967, Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Special Name 
Series, Box 18, Folder: “Romney, George, 1967 (4).” 
206 Ibid. 
207 Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin, 219.  
208 Dwight D. Eisenhower to George Romney, July 25, 1966, Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Special Name 
Series, Box 17, Folder: “Romney, George, 1963–66.”  
209 Ibid. 
65 
 
needed help addressing Vietnam, and Eisenhower tried to clearly articulate his thoughts on the 
conflict in various letters to Romney. Despite this assistance, Vietnam continued to plague the 
Romney campaign. 
 Although Eisenhower sought to help Romney with Vietnam, the former soon realized 
that the war was a losing issue for the latter. In fact, before the summer ended, Eisenhower 
veritably encouraged Romney to avoid discussing Vietnam whenever possible. Eisenhower 
wrote, “I noticed that you have found it necessary to comment on the Vietnam war. Personally, I 
think this is a bit risky; I think that none of us know enough about the entire affair to have any 
confidence in our own opinions.”210 Vietnam would plague Romney throughout his campaign, 
especially after the governor remarked that his initial support for the war could be attributed to 
brainwashing by military and government officials. Romney’s confusion on Vietnam and 
reference to brainwashing has been described as a “colossal political misstep,” and historians 
agree that Romney’s campaign only deteriorated as he moved into the fall of 1967.211 
 In contrast to Romney, Nixon had already spent years learning from Eisenhower and 
required little guidance. Furthermore, Nixon had long established a reputation as a Cold Warrior 
and had mastered how to sound like he had a solution for the Vietnam War.212 Eisenhower 
privately expressed his strong support for Nixon’s candidacy to former secretary of the interior 
Fred Seaton, who helped with the former vice president’s campaign, in a January 1967 letter. “I 
agree with you about the qualification of Dick Nixon for political office,” Eisenhower wrote, “I 
cannot think of anyone better prepared than he is to undertake the responsibilities of the 
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Presidency.”213 Nixon may have been out of office for a few years by this point, but he had not 
ceased working in politics. In addition to hitting the campaign trail for fellow Republicans, 
Nixon also remained engaged with events at home and abroad.  
 In 1960, Eisenhower had wanted his vice president to carry on his policies for at least 
another term. Even though Nixon’s anticommunist activities endeared him to conservatives, he 
possessed distinctly moderate, if not liberal, views on domestic and international affairs. This 
perspective developed throughout the 1950s, and, by the 1960s, Nixon occupied a rare place in 
Republican politics. Conservatives held on to Nixon’s early years in politics, which did lean a 
little to the right. However, as society changed, so did Nixon’s views. A strong advocate of civil 
rights, supportive of Social Security, and an internationalist, Nixon would carefully play the 
perception game in order to court conservatives even though his platform often disagreed with 
theirs.214  
To a degree, Nixon filled roles that Eisenhower could not once the two were out of office, 
for example that of roving diplomat. With his military background, Eisenhower would have 
expertly fulfilled this role. However, it was the younger, fitter Nixon who, for example, traveled 
to the Middle East in 1967 and then reported on his experiences to the State Department.215 Such 
trips, even if details remained secret, allowed Nixon to demonstrate skill in handling 
international politics and remind voters of his travels as Eisenhower’s vice president.  
 Despite Nixon’s experience and relative familiarity with important subjects, he still 
consulted Eisenhower regularly. Whether it was submitting a speech to the general for review or 
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asking for advice on Vietnam, Nixon did not hesitate to utilize one of his greatest resources — 
Eisenhower. Whereas Romney struggled to implement Eisenhower’s suggestions into his 
discussions of Vietnam, Nixon did not hesitate to use the general’s words, if necessary. In 
response to one of Eisenhower’s letters on the war, Nixon wrote on September 26, 1967, “As a 
matter of fact, I’m very much taken by your line that in these areas ‘the struggle is  not so much 
Communism versus freedom, as it is an orderly society against anarchy or despotism.’ It’s a 
point well taken and well put, and with your permission I may plagiarize it.”216 At the bottom of 
Nixon’s letter, Eisenhower answered the request — “Fine!” is written right above Eisenhower’s 
signed initials.217  
Nixon and Romney may have both fallen on the moderate part of the Republican political 
spectrum, but they presented voters with a distinct choice. The edge went to Nixon, however, 
because the former vice president, despite many moderate opinions, still appealed to 
conservatives on certain matters. The right wing’s fear of communism had turned into a fear of 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Leading conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly sided with 
Nixon because of his defense plans, particularly a commitment to nuclear defense programs.218 
With some conservatives on his side, Nixon also benefitted from Romney’s misfortunate 
handling of Vietnam. After Romney bowed out of the contest, Nixon had a mostly clear path to 
the 1968 Republican presidential nomination. Reagan remained in the shadows, ready to jump in 
if Nixon faltered, but Nixon did not provide the conservative governor with an opportunity 
similar to the one Romney’s gaffes gave to Nixon. In the first round of voting at the nominating 
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convention, Republican delegates selected Nixon to represent the party again and hopefully lead 
the GOP to victory, unlike eight years ago.219 
 A Win for Ike 
 
By 1967, Eisenhower had suffered multiple heart attacks, and his schedule was carefully 
structured to allow him ample rest time each day. His mind remained sharp and active, and he 
resisted his physical limitations, particularly when he wanted to discuss political matters. In one 
letter to Nixon, Eisenhower wrote, “When you come to see me please allow plenty of time. 
Although it is true that I have to take certain amounts of rest time, I think I can still perform that 
little chore and at the same time have plenty of time for a long talk with you.”220 Bothered more 
by the fact that he needed to rest than the prospect of a lengthy meeting with Nixon, Eisenhower 
considered his limitations a nuisance. This attitude defined Eisenhower’s approach to politics 
from August 1967 onward. Despite the state of his health, Eisenhower insisted on doing as much 
as possible to help Nixon and the GOP. Just about a year and a half later, Eisenhower’s lifetime 
of hard work and stress would catch up to him, and he died just weeks after Nixon’s 
inauguration.  
 Before the GOP named its presidential nominee, Eisenhower sought to prevent the 
GOP’s recent mistakes from occurring again. As the campaign progressed, Eisenhower focused 
his attention on issues that had plagued Nixon’s first bid for president. Among the greatest 
problems the GOP encountered during the 1960 campaign was Nixon’s likability, or lack 
thereof. This time around, the Nixon campaign made sure to stage question and answer sessions, 
                                                 
219 Gould, Grand Old Party, 375–7. 
220 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, August 23, 1967, Eisenhower Library, Post-Presidential Special 
Name Series, Box 14, Folder: “Nixon, Richard M., 1967 (1).” 
69 
 
which Eisenhower approved. These meetings, he said, gave Nixon the “opportunity for 
spontaneity, humor and hard hitting observations.”221 Efforts such as those improved public 
perception of Nixon and he transitioned from a qualified but unelectable candidate to the man 
whose qualifications meant that he needed to win in November.222 
 Nixon and Eisenhower both experienced déjà vu moments during the 1968 campaign 
season. In addition to the resurfacing of Nixon’s public appeal issues, Eisenhower endured 
criticism, similar to 1964, for not publicly declaring his opinion of the campaign. When 
Goldwater ran for office, many Republicans and critics of Goldwater had identified Eisenhower 
as one of the only individuals who could have quickly ended the conservative’s candidacy. In the 
case of the 1968 campaign, Eisenhower refrained from supporting Nixon too early, drawing the 
ire of those who wanted to know the ex-president’s pick. Eisenhower explained his reasoning to 
Admiral Frederick M. Reeder in April 1968, writing, “as of this moment, [Nixon] does not 
believe that a personal endorsement — that would, of necessity, appear derogatory of others — 
is either necessary or desirable at this time, because of its possible [divisive] effect on the 
Party.”223 Both situations provided Eisenhower with the opportunity to directly influence the 
party’s nomination process and on each occasion, despite his personal assessments of the 
respective candidates, he opted to stay quiet for the long-term sake of the party.224  
 As the campaign intensified in the summer of 1968, Eisenhower was increasingly unable 
to help Nixon. Respectful communication between the two continued, but it was noticeably 
briefer. Nixon and his supporters knew that Eisenhower could not do much to help them, but as 
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long as the link between the two remained, Nixon had a powerful ally. Merely mentioning 
Eisenhower’s name or his time in the Eisenhower administration proved valuable to Nixon. 
During the Republican nominating convention, Nixon frequently referred to his work with the 
party’s elder statesman. In addition, Eisenhower left an impression with the attendees when a 
video he made expressing his support for Nixon played for the crowd. The video showed how 
frail Eisenhower had become by the summer of 1968. Nixon carefully referenced Eisenhower’s 
health in his acceptance speech, calling on Republicans to win the next campaign for Ike.225  
 The careful steps taken by Republicans in 1968 nearly failed to produce the desired 
result. Given the sharp rejection of the Democrats in the 1966 midterm elections, the 1968 result 
seemed destined to go to the Republican candidate. However, the GOP encountered a strong 
fight in the last weeks of the contest. Vice President Hubert Humphrey rallied in the final stages 
after he started to publicly criticize President Johnson’s Vietnam policies. Nixon also 
encountered a challenge from the South, as Governor George Wallace of Alabama ran on an 
independent ticket. Wallace’s campaign proved particularly damaging to Nixon, as the majority 
of Wallace’s nearly ten million supporters likely would have voted Republican. Although the 
results proved closer than the GOP would have liked, Nixon still brought the party back to the 
White House.226  
 Weeks away from death by the time of Nixon’s election, Eisenhower remained a party 
leader. In December 1968, he sent a letter to Nixon on the subject of the president-elect’s 
proposed cabinet. The general offered, briefly, his thoughts on different appointees and even 
suggested different individuals for a few of the posts Nixon had already determined.227 Up until 
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the very end, Eisenhower continued to act as a leader of the Republican Party. Failing health and 
hospitals did not stop the general from leading his army of moderates.  
72 
 
Conclusion 
 What is Dwight D. Eisenhower’s legacy? President and general are two descriptors 
forever associated with Eisenhower. However, the memory of Eisenhower moved to a different 
level when architect Frank Gehry recently opted to depict him as a barefoot boy from Kansas in 
designs for the planned Eisenhower Memorial in Washington, D.C. It is notable that Gehry chose 
this motif for his statue, rather than depicting Eisenhower in full uniform, as he is depicted on the 
grounds of the Eisenhower Presidential Library and Museum, or in a suit. The rendering of 
young Eisenhower would look out across four acres, gazing at depictions of moments from 
Eisenhower’s career of public service.228 But some voices, including Eisenhower’s son John and 
other members of the family, expressed concern over the design. Historians and pundits weighed 
in as well, with the overarching concern that Gehry’s design failed to properly memorialize 
Eisenhower and his accomplishments. The National Civic Art Society referred to the original 
concept as “an embarrassment to the man it was meant to honor.”229 
Historian Geoffrey Kabaservice noted that the group of critics did not include one party 
that should be concerned with Eisenhower’s legacy — the Republicans. In an article on the 
memorial controversy, Kabaservice wrote that the “Republicans’ silence on the matter of 
Eisenhower’s legacy says volumes about how far the party has come since his day. Rather than 
claim ownership over his legacy, they have abandoned it entirely, to the detriment of their party 
and their country.”230 Why would the Republicans abandon celebrating Eisenhower? During his 
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eight years in office, Eisenhower managed to balance the budget, promote civil rights measures, 
and keep the Cold War cold, among other achievements.  
Eisenhower left the White House just over fifty years ago, and since then the Republican 
Party has moved decisively to the right. The two Republican presidents after Eisenhower — 
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford — followed a more moderate path, but controversy plagued their 
administrations. Understandably, the GOP moved away from Nixon after the Watergate break-in 
scandal, and Ford’s decision to pardon Nixon turned into a defining moment of his brief 
presidency. Ford tried, but lost the presidency to Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1976. The 
Democrats’ return to the White House was brief, and conservatives finally achieved a decisive 
victory in 1980 when Ronald Reagan swept into office. Reagan’s ascendancy to the White House 
marks a clear turning point in the ideological history of the GOP. Even though moderates did not 
completely disappear from the party, the emphasis since Reagan has been on conservative values 
and policies.  
Despite his popularity and success, Eisenhower’s moderate Republicanism has limited 
his legacy within today’s GOP. And indeed, the chasm between Eisenhower and conservatives 
existed from the start of his presidential candidacy in 1952, but intensified over the years. In 
April 1964, a few weeks before the Republicans’ nominating convention, The Saturday Evening 
Post printed an article by Eisenhower, “Why I am a Republican.” First, the ex-president 
explained that he joined the GOP because the “party offered the conscientious citizen the best 
guide for political judgment in these modern times.”231 Eisenhower followed up this remark by 
stating that the Democrats’ policies put America on “a path of federal expediency which, like a 
narcotic, may give us a false sense of well-being, but in the long run is dangerous to our future, 
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our basic rights, our moral fiber and our individual freedom.”232 This condemnation of the 
Democrats’ policies and leadership, at first glance, cemented Eisenhower’s ties to the GOP. 
However, the latter two-thirds of the article emphasize moderate Republicanism. Eisenhower 
even incorporated elements of his 1949 speech before the American Bar Association and the 
importance of following the “middle way.”  
Eisenhower’s “Why I am a Republican” offered the ex-president the opportunity to 
reflect on his political career and place in the GOP. Although brief, the article demonstrated 
Eisenhower’s commitment to his “middle way” philosophy. Believing in the same principles 
before, during, and after his presidency, Eisenhower’s loyalty to his perspective isolated him 
from the ever changing GOP. Despite his accomplishments in office, Eisenhower would remain 
a part of a past era for the party.  
Republicans today might not invoke Eisenhower’s legacy when courting voters, as 
happens with Reagan — or the image of Reagan that exists — but that does not mean 
Eisenhower has not shaped the political world. The most immediate example, of course, would 
be the Nixon administration. Heavily influenced by his time with Eisenhower, Nixon oversaw 
the passage of equal rights legislation and traveled to China to improve America’s relationship 
with the communist nation.233 Nixon might have started his Republican political career as a 
conservative, but during his presidency, conservatives felt betrayed by his moderate, if not 
liberal, social and foreign policies.  
In other words, Eisenhower enjoyed success for a time in keeping the party along a 
moderate path, notwithstanding the conservatives’ eventual triumph. And Nixon was not the only 
Republican to follow in at least some of Eisenhower’s footsteps. The latest crop of Tea Party 
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congresspersons aside, the necessity of compromise and appealing to more than strictly 
conservative voters still encourages Republican politicians to, at times, pursue moderate 
positions. At the least, today’s American politics, no matter how fractious and noisy they are, 
demonstrate the enduring wisdom of Eisenhower’s assumption that moderate Republicanism, 
combining elements from the right and left, appeals to a great percentage of American voters.  
And yet presently, Eisenhower is a politician without a party. The party — or faction — 
that Eisenhower led diminished over the years, and modern Republicans have drifted away from 
the man whose goal was to modernize the Republican Party of the 1950s and 1960s and establish 
a more progressive party. But even if Republicans are presently more willing to discuss the 
Reagan presidency than Eisenhower’s, that does not mean that Eisenhower did not influence the 
modern political world. Ironically, the leader of moderate Republicanism has turned into a figure 
that many centrist Democrats look to for inspiration.  
This may not be the political legacy that Eisenhower envisioned for himself, but perhaps 
he would approve of his ongoing influence. To Eisenhower, country came before party. In “Why 
I am a Republican,” Eisenhower wrote “I am not, I hope in all sincerity, a blind Republican who 
puts party above all else. First and foremost, I am a citizen of the United States. My basic 
allegiance is to those unchanging principles of self-government laid down in the founding 
documents.”234 Mirroring her grandfather’s sentiment, Susan Eisenhower opened her remarks at 
the 2008 Democratic National Convention by saying the she spoke “not as a Republican or a 
Democrat, but as an American.”235 
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Before he died, Dwight Eisenhower witnessed Richard Nixon’s election to the 
presidency, and he believed this event indicated a future for moderate Republicanism. The 
statesman did not witness the changes that occurred during and after the Nixon presidency; and 
he could not predict the scandals that his subordinate would endure. The GOP did not turn into 
the party that Eisenhower envisioned, and he may have faded from his party’s consciousness and 
history, but his legacy of moderation in politics endures. Eisenhower may have titled his 
Saturday Evening Post article “Why I am a Republican,” but his parting message was for voters 
to not get lost in partisan battles. “As an American who puts country above party,” Eisenhower 
wrote, “I deeply and sincerely believe that all fellow citizens, whether Republicans, Democrats 
or independents, owe it to themselves and their country to pause for a moment and stand back 
from the partisan fray to ask themselves: How can the United States get back on the right path? 
Which political philosophy offers us the surest guide for the future?”236 This message — this 
willingness to question policies and party lines — is Eisenhower’s political legacy, and it offers 
hope for today’s troubled American political culture.  
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